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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to argue that Mao Zedong
sought revolutionary immortality, through the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Despite his publicly-stated
desire to improve China on many fronts, the Cultural
Revolution had another purpose: the renewal of revolutionary
fervor that characterized China during the early years of
Mao's rule, and its essential by-product, the implementation
of Mao Zedong Thought into everyday life.
Mao believed that
if China could be transformed into his unique vision of
communism, and if the peoples' revolutionary zeal could be
sustained and harnessed to modernize the country, the success
of this unusual methodology would secure his place in
history.
Unfortunately for China and for Mao's dreams,
factionalization within the Chinese Communist Party and the
social havoc wreaked by the Red Guard resulted in the rise of
the moderates, who discarded Mao Zedong Thought for a more
pragmatic approach to economic reform and modernization.
The
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution ignited extremist
forces that were beyond Mao's control and failed to
accomplish his real goal of assuring his revolutionary
immortality.

Introduct ion

Throughout Mao Zedong’s tenure as Chairman of the
Chinese Communist Party, he struggled to maintain his
prominence as the leader of China.1

Applying his

interpretation of Marxism-Leninism to China, Mao formulated
campaigns designed to incorporate the masses into the
political process.

Mao had always championed the peasants;

he believed their support was crucial to his maintenance of
power. But it was M a o ’s strict devotion to the masses that
eventually led to his downfall.

After the failure of two of

his campaigns, the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Great
Leap Forward, Mao lost much of his political power.

This

thesis will argue that Mao contrived the Great Proletarian
.Cultural Revolution to regain political power and to assure
himself revolutionary immortality.

It will be maintained

that in order to accomplish his goal, Mao attempted to remove
those who opposed his philosophy.

The thesis will contend

that the movement led to a struggle for power between the Mao
and his supporters and the moderates led by Liu Shaoqi.2
In the first chapter, several aspects of Mao Zedong's

1Biographical information of Mao Zedong is in appendix A.
Distinction between the structure of the Chinese Communist
Party and the Chinese government is in appendix B.
2Biographical information of Liu Shaoqi is in appendix
A.
V

political philosophy will be explored, including the
continuous revolution, the mass line, and "Reds versus
Experts".

The implementation of his ideology will be

illustrated by examining the circumstances leading to the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The Hundred Flowers

Campaign and the Great Leap Forward will be investigated to
illustrate the impracticality of Mao Zedong Thought.

The

second chapter will address the full scope of the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution,

including Mao's

consolidation of power, the campaign to rejuvenate lost
revolutionary fervor, the purges of intellectuals and
capitalists, the rise and fall of the Red Guard, the
involvement of the Revolutionary Leftists, and the eventual
decline of the movement with the seizure and trial of the
Gang of Four.

The third chapter will analyze the Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution, exploring Mao's campaigns,
and the rise of two competing factions, the Maoists and the
moderates, at the begining of the Cultural Revolution.
Finally, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will be
reviewed and explained as Mao's attempt to attain
revolutionary immortality.

Chapter I
Mao Zedong Thought and the Early Campaigns

From 1935 to 1976, the first 40 years of existence of
the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP), Mao Zedong was the

principle guide as well as founder.3

Mao devised his own

adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese model,
known as "Mao Zedong thought."

In China, Mao has often been

given the same respect and praise as former emperors,
to the point of deification.

now

almost

During his life, his control

over the lives of the Chinese people gave him unprecedented
power.

Following such political disasters as the Hundred

Flowers campaign,

the Great Leap Forward,

Education Movement,

and the Socialist

which will be explored in greater depth

later, Mao believed it was essential to reassert the people's
complete and unquestionable commitment to communism.
a record of failed indoctrination movements,

Despite

he announced the

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in order to inculcate
communism to the whole of Chinese society.

This campaign

would be his last massive attempt to indoctrinate the people
with his ideology and purify the CCP.

Mao wanted only devout

followers of his philosophy in the top leadership of the CCP
and therefore carried out purges to remove the less zealous
party m e m b e r s .

1985

3John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution:
(New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 233-34.

1800-

2
This chapter will argue that the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution was M a o ’s attempt to purify the CCP by
molding it in his own fashion.

It will further assert that,

due to his demand for undeviating adherence to his own
ideology,

the CCP was divided into two main factions: the

Maoists,

who were ideologues,

and the pragmatists.

Maoists'

attempts to gain complete power failed,

The

and after

197 6, the pragmatists rose to the top leadership positions.
The Cultural Revolution was a power struggle between Mao and
the pragmatists;
reality.

it was a struggle between ideology and

Mao was unwilling to relinquish power because of

his desire to attain immortality.

He seemed to believe that

without his leadership,

communism would wither and his dreams

would not be realized.

This chapter will conclude that Mao's

massive campaigns were poorly planned and far too ambitious
to be implemented effectively.
The philosophy of Mao Zedong must be explored in order
to understand Mao's quest for immortality,

and the way in

which he used his campaigns to pursue it.

There are four

components of Maoist ideology that will be examined below:
first,

the idea of the Mass Line;

revolution;
and finally,

third,

second,

the continuous

the contention between "Red" and "Expert";

Mao's campaigns.

The balance of this chapter

will explore these four aspects of Mao Zedong thought and
conclude by describing their role in the events which led to
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

3

The Mass

Line

One of the most notable aspects of Mao Zedong's thought
is the concept of the "mass line".

Mao believed that the

enormous size of the Chinese population could be viewed as an
asset.

In essence,

the purpose of the mass line was to

implement Mao's vision of communism at the grass roots level,
the peasants were to be the vanguard of the revolution.

It

was a strategy designed to involve the whole of Chinese
society by incorporating the vast population into the
political and economic processes.

Mao contended that the

mass line would be the most efficient way to indoctrinate
China's immense population with communism.

He saw the

relationship between the people and the party as reciprocal,
not one-sided in which the party alone would formulate and
implement policy without considering the masses.

Mao defined

the mass line in 1943:
[A]11 correct leadership is necessarily "from
the masses, to the masses."
This means: take
the ideas of the masses and through study turn
them into concentrated and systematic ideas,
then go to the masses and propagate and
explain these until the masses embrace them as
their own, hold fast to them and translate
them into action, and test the correctness of
these ideas in the masses and once again go to
the
masses so that the ideas are persevered
in and carried through. Such is the Marxist

4
theory of knowledge.4

Mao contended that the party members could learn from
the masses and use them to guide the continuous struggle
towards communism.

He believed that by focusing the

attention of the revolution on the countryside,
majority of the population,
quickly.

However,

home to the

he could achieve communism more

the peasants could make judgments only on

their own small scale.

It was impossible for them to see

China as an entire political and economic entity.
had access only to his own village,
factor.

The farmer

an obviously limiting

The people were not properly educated in agriculture

and engineering to be able to form qualified opinions
concerning public policy.

Therefore,

the ideas of all the

peasants must be taken into consideration individually and
then woven together to create a unified policy which was
articulated

by leaders.

Mao relied on the mass line because

he believed

it connected him to the countryside where

he had

initially won support at the grass roots level during the
early days of the revolution.

He believed that the support

of the peasantry of China was invaluable for political unity
and for an efficient system of policy formulation.
Mao

maintained that the leadership of the CCP must

realize the importance of the Mass Line.

He argued that the

4Mao Zedong as quoted in Tony Smith,
Thinking Like a Communist (New York: W.& W.
Norton & Co., 1987), 112.

5
rural populace should be the focus of the party;

that

peasants represented the backbone of Chinese society,
with their support,

and

the CCP would continue to grow and the

goal of communism could be realized without sacrificing
legitimacy.

In his speech in the summer of 1955, Mao

stated:
[M]ost of the peasants show enthusiasm for
taking the socialist r o a d . ..For them,
socialism is the only way o u t . These peasants
make up 60 or 70 percent of the entire rural
p o p u l a t i o n ....but some of our comrades ignore
these f a c t s . This means that their eyes are
on the comparatively small number of well-todo peasants to the neglect of the great
majority of the poor peasants.
This is one
kind of wrong thinking.5
Mao also argued that the road towards communism would be
easier because of the nature of the rural populace.
stated that the people could be molded
because they were "poor and blank".

He

into communists

Mao defined this phrase

in a speech in April 1956:
By "poor" I mean that we have not much
industry and that our agriculture is not so
very advanced either.
By "blank" I mean that
we are like a sheet of blank paper, since our
cultural and scientific level is not high.
Those who are poor want
change; a blank sheet
of paper is good for writing o n. 6
After the speech was printed in the People 's Daily,
cries of outrage came from people who felt humiliated by such

5Mao Zedong as quoted Ibid.,

118.

6Mao Zedong as quoted ibid.,

120.

6
degrading remarks.

Mao failed to take into account the

tradition of the Chinese people with this "poor and blank"
speech.

He ignored the thousand year history of

Confucianism,

which was deeply ingrained in the culture of

the peasants.

Mao was firm in the belief that because the

people were "poor and b l a n k , " the revolution towards
communism could be accomplished by a series of wide sweeping
campaigns.

Many people became apprehensive about these

campaigns and this fostered a suspicion of the government.
To regain the trust of the people, Mao stated it would be
simpler to realize the goals of communism in a society

(such

as rural C h i n a ) , that does not have a strong capitalist
foundation

(for example Western E u r o p e ) .

In Western Europe,

capitalism is so strongly entrenched in society that the
whole economic system would have to be changed in order to
bring about communism.

China,

conversely,

is not as

industrially advanced and would not need to destroy an
existing infrastructure but build the first one in the
communist design.

By constantly gathering and adapting the

ideas of the peasants and then making the leap to a more
modern way of life, Mao would implement communism in a more
efficient manner,

without the wide-scale violence and turmoil

typical of other communist societies like the Soviet Union.
To maintain the level of dedication to communism required by
the Mass Line, Mao relied on the idea of the continuous
revolution.

7
The poor and blank speech also suggested that China
might mover rapidly to socialism but only if the party would
do the "writing" on the "blank sheet of p a p e r . ”

The speech

further stated that "most of the peasants show enthusiasm for
taking the socialist road," and Mao illustrated his faith in
the masses by adding,

"We must have faith in the masses and

we must have faith in the party.
principles.

These are two cardinal

If we doubt these principles,

we shall

accomplish nothing."7
The problem with implementing his ideological goals was
the party.

Mao believed that it was a poor instrument to

carry out his plan or to do the "writing on the blank sheet
of paper."

He lost further ground with the party because it

deleted the rule that Mao Zedong Thought was to act as the
guideline for party policy.
speech,

In February 1957, he gave a

"On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among

the P e o p l e ."

This speech attacked the party as an

institution responsible for obstructing the revolution and
that it was the p e o p l e ’s responsibility for rectifying this
situation.
In this speech,

Mao distinguished between "antagonistic

contradictions" of the sort that existed between the Chinese
people and those who opposed their revolution,

and "non-

antagonistic contradictions" of the kind that would occur

7Mao Zedong as quoted in ibid,

120.

8
within the people's democratic dictatorship,
the friends of the revolution.

that is, among

Mao stated that:

[T]here are still certain contradictions
between the government and the people.
These
include contradictions among the interests of
the
state, the interests of the collective,
and the interests of the individual; between
democracy and centralism; between the
leadership and the led; and the contradiction
arising from the bureaucratic style of work of
certain government workers in their relations
with the masses.8

Mao stated that the contradictions of the goals of the
party and of the people would not facilitate progress for
China.

Thus,

he believed that these contradictions were

impeding the movement towards modernization,
industrialization and collectivization;

in short,

these

contradictions were standing in the way of the continuous
revolution.

The

Continuous

Revolution

For at least the first decade after the Communists
assumed control of China from the nationalist Guomindang
(KMT),8 the CCP could claim that there was a legitimate
revolution,

one in which the people genuinely authorized the

exercise of political power to bring about social change to a
8Mao Zedong as quoted in ibid,

121.

9The KMT is derived from the Wade-Giles spelling of
Guomindang which is spelled Kuomintang.

9
popularly supported regime.

Therefore,

the leadership of the

Chinese Communist revolution during its first decade was both
legitimate and revolutionary.

The CCP gained support from

all social classes during the Chinese National Revolution in
which they seized power from the KMT.

The peasants followed

Communist leadership because of the p a r t y ’s resistance to the
invading imperialist Japanese army,

and because the CCP

treated the peasants with dignity and respect when they
needed to use their land,

unlike the KMT who would not pay

for items used in the struggle against the Japanese.
Students supported the party's cause because it clearly
advocated Chinese nationalism,

and many college-age men and

women joined the Communist army in response to the call to
chiu-kuo

(save the n a t i o n ) .

Further,

a significant

proportion of the urban and commercial groups came to support
the party during the civil war because of their belief or
hope that the Communists might have solutions to China's
numerous economic problems.

In their eyes,

the Communists

were preferable to the Guomindang because the KMT had largely
discredited itself through corruption,
brutality.

inefficiency and

The educated and intellectual elites also backed

the CCP for all of the above reasons,

and because they had

accepted fragments of Marxist-Leninism ideology since the May

10
Fourth movement in 1919.10
After the first decade of CCP rule, the revolution began
to lose its legitimacy.

The road to communism must have

seemed very long and slow.

The people,

and perhaps some

leaders as well, became impatient with the CCP.
that because of the growing dissatisfaction,
towards

Mao believed

the struggle

"true communism" had to be revitalized.

Therefore,

Mao asserted to the CCP that steps must be taken to reawaken
the people's commitment to communism.n

The period after 1956

marked his preoccupation with implementing the continuous
revolution by stimulating grass roots political action and he
focused on the ideology of the CCP in this period more than
ever before.

Chalmers Johnson argues that a partial

explanation of Mao's growing immersion in ideology after 1956
was the unprecedented international problems which demanded
careful ideological explanation.

Khrushchev's anti-Stalin

revelations and the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution,
were probably influential in Mao's decision to re-examine his
own ideological stance.

Once started on a deceptively easy-

looking path, he found himself committed to ideological
positions upon which he subsequently had to act,

and the

iQChalmers Johnson, "The Two Chinese Revolutions," China
Quarterly 39(July-September 1969):
13-14.
For more
information on the May Forth movement see pp. 12-15.
11Maurice Meisner "Utopian Goals and Ascetic Values in
Chinese Communist Ideology," Journal of Asian Studies
2 8 (November, 1968): 104.

11
whole process began to escalate in a way that has yet to end.12
Mao was no longer concerned with applying the USSR's version
of Marxism-Leninism to China,

a vastly underdeveloped country

both politically and economically, but rather formulated
large-scale plans to convert China into his version of a
true,

communist state.

He believed that taking such an

ambitious approach to the conversion to communism was
consistent with,

and even required by, the size of the

country and the circumstances in which he found i t .
indoctrinate a country like China
life,

all-inclusive campaigns

To

to a radically new way

had to be employed.

people must be committed to the changes or,

Thus,

Mao rejected

the notion that social change

can be tightly controlled

directed from above,

he saw exemplified in the

Soviet model.

Rather,

the

in Mao's words,

must be committed to the continuous revolution.

a notion

of

or

he believed that the development and

resolution of contradictions in society and social progress
came about through the interaction of social forces,

through

the reciprocal interaction between the elites and the
p e a s a n t s .13
Mao wanted to move ahead towards Communism in large,
incremental s t e p s .

12johnson.,

These steps were to be his mass campaigns

p . 22.

13Graham Y o u n g and Den n i s W oo dward,
Revolution
and
Continuous
Revolution,"
1 8 (September 1978): 918.

"Uninterrupted
Asian
Survey

12
to change the country from

a feudal to Communist society.

To guide China through the difficult transition,
envisioned the exemplary worker,

Mao

someone who not only would be

a good communist with a tenacious belief in the goals and
life style appropriate to a true Marxist-Leninist, but also
would possess the skills and abilities to implement these
goals using technical knowledge.
would be both "Red",
"Expert",

Mao stated that this person

for his commitment to communism,

and

for the technical skills to implement the goals of

communism.

Red and Expert
One of the changes in society that Mao stressed was the
de-emphasis of social and economic class.

He wanted Chinese

society to be completely egalitarian and homogeneous and he
explained his interpretation of utopian society in his
identification of the "Red and Expert."

The red and expert

notion combined Marxist utopianism with several other
characteristics of the Chinese Communist mentality.

Ideally,

the "red and expert" exemplified not only the social values
and norms of the present,
future.

but also the Communist goals of the

Maurice Meisner states that the red and expert

archetype was conceived as the product of existing socialist
society and the exemplar of the ascetic lifestyle necessary
in the present.

He was also the symbol of a more advanced

13
"communist consciousness," and thus the producer of the
broader social goals of the Marxist vision of the future.
characteristically described,

As

the red and expert worker was

to be the model for a new generation of all-around man who is
a "jack of all trades," capable of engaging in scientific
tasks,

cultural undertakings,

and physical labor.

pillar of communist social and moral v a l u e s .
slave to the past,

He is a

He is not a

and has the capability and freedom to be

creative and to break the bonds of tradition.

The red and

expert laborer could handle both civilian and military work;
he could combine communist theory with practical work,

and

would be capable of switching from one job to another as the
needs of society dictated.

In short,

he would be the new

breed of Communist man, both red and expert,

who was to

realize Mao Zedong's vision of a whole nation of socialist
conscious,

cultured laborers.14

Although,

in theory,

the vision of the red and expert

may have seemed feasible to Mao,
far from possible.

in practice such a goal was

China simply did not have the industrial

or the educational capability to produce such people.

There

were many Reds who carried out the party line and obeyed
Maoist thought.
knowledge,

There were also Experts who had technical

but who were too pragmatic and unwilling to

capitulate and implement communist ideology in the

^Meisne r. ,

p . 106.

14
industries.

As previously stated, the vast majority of the

Chinese population were peasants who had little access to
education to attain the technical knowledge required to be
truly red and expert.

The contradiction between the reds and

the experts led to a great many problems for China,
politically,

technologically,

the downfall of the

and economically.

Examples of

red and expert were quite evident in the

campaigns initiated by Mao.

One of the clearest examples of

the difficulty inherent in the red and expert theory was the
Great Leap Forward,

one of several campaigns to be explored

in further detail.

The

C a m p a ig n s
The next section will explore the campaigns that

preceded the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; these
will include the Hundred Flowers Campaign,
Forward,

the Commune System,

the Great Leap

the Great Leap in Industry,

and

the Socialist Education Movement and Mao-Study Campaign.
In order for Mao's ideology to be proved correct and
workable it had to be implemented in practicle situations.
Thus to legitimize his ideas he set out to incorporate the
masses in his political campaigns.

Mao beleived that,

the

people's will should be known not so that government can
reflect this opinion but so that the state can better
implement its programs.

In an attempt to merge his theory

15
with practice,

Mao stated in 1962:

Everyone knows that if a factory has no raw
material it cannot do any processing.
If the
raw material is not adequate in quantity and
quality it cannot produce good finished
p r o d u c t s . Without democracy, you have no
understanding of what is happening down below;
the situation will be unclear; you will be
unable to collect sufficient opinions from all
sides; there can be no communication between
top and bottom, is
In order to over come his adversaries in the party,

he

appealed to alternate sources to give his policies
legitimacy.

Two of the main groups Mao turned to were the

peasants and the intellectuals.
His first major campaign was the Hundred Flowers
Campaign.

This two-year campaign was initiated in 1956.

Mao's gambit was to appeal for popular criticism of the party
under the slogan,

"Let a hundred flowers bloom,

let a hundred

schools of thought contend."16 Mao contended that the party
could be strengthened by criticism from non-party members.
Lu Dingyi,

director of the party's Propaganda Department,

asserted:
We still have enemies, and the class struggle
is still going on inside the country.
But our
enemies inside the country in particular, have
had their teeth d r a w n . .. We must keep up a
relentless struggle against them; we must not

15Mao Zedong as quoted in Smith,
16Smith,

121.

135.

16
relax our efforts.17
Lu interpreted Mao's statement of "Let a hundred flowers
bloom",

to concern writers and artists,

schools of thought contend",

and "Let a hundred

to apply to scientists.

He

argued that the reason for the policy was that the country
needed art,

literature,

strong in order to

and science,

to be prosperous and

promote the independent thinking,

debate,

and creative work which would guide China into the future.18
When he first presented the idea of the Hundred Flowers
Campaign,

other top party officials urged Mao not to engage

in this campaign because they believed it would result in
mass dissension rather than positive criticism of the party
philosophy.

Despite these warnings, Mao persisted and the

campaign was initiated in May of 1956.
The Hundred Flowers Campaign was a new phase for the
party,

and part of a general improvement in the working

conditions of the intellectuals.
foreign publications,

They were given access to

as well as more free time and scope for

incentive to work within the system.

Zhou Enlai stated,

overwhelming majority of the intellectuals have become
government workers in the service of Socialism and are

17Biographical information for Lu Dingyi
in appendix A.
Lu Dingyi as quoted by
Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the
Cultural Revolution (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1974), 93.
18I b i d ., 53-54.

"The

17
already part of the working-class...

a fundamental change has

taken place among Chinese intellectuals in the past six
years".19

Mao urged the intellectuals to voice criticisms of

the cadres who had been watching over them.

He argued:

Most of our intellectuals have made marked
progress during the past seven years.
They
express themselves in favor of the socialist
system.
Many of them are diligently studying
Marxism, and some have become Communists....
There are, of course, still some intellectuals
who are skeptical of socialism or who do not
approve of it, but they are in a minority. 2°
John King Fairbank asserts that Mao estimated that among
a total of, at most,

five million intellectuals

(i.e., middle-

school graduates and a bo v e ) , not more than 3 percent were by
this time hostile to Marxism.

Therefore,

he believed that

the Hundred Flowers criticism of the C C P 's bureaucratic style
and methods would be constructive,

representing a "non-

antagonistic contradiction" among the people,

and arguable

within a context of complete loyalty to the Communist
system.21
At

first the intellectuals were reluctant to

criticize

the party because they believed that if they dared to attack
the CCP,

they would be in danger of retribution.

for the

first year the intellectuals were s i l e n t .

Therefore,
In May of

19Biographical information for Zhou Enlai in appendix A.
I b i d ., p .93.

20ibid.
2lFairbank,

293.

18
1957,

one year after Mao had urged them to criticize the

party,

the CCP launched a campaign to criticize the

performance of the
under attack,

party bureaucracy.

Once the cadres came

the intellectuals who had suffered under them

unleashed a widespread barrage of criticism.

The

intellectuals rebuked the party in rapidly escalating terms,
with its basic premises,

working style,

doctrines,

practices suddenly coming under attack.
so severe that within five weeks,

and

The criticisms were

the Hundred Flowers

campaign had to be halted.22
Non-party members criticized the CCP for the
dictatorship of the single party system.

The attacks on the

party came from both workers and intellectuals.
protests resulted from the campaign,

Strikes and

as the Chinese people

voiced their differences with the CCP.

The party leaders

soon realized that the Hundred Flowers Campaign had led to
social unrest,
quickly.

and they took steps to end the criticism

In June 1957,

the CCP signaled an abrupt shift from

liberalism to an anticapitalist campaign.

Zhou Enlai warned

non-Communist leaders they would be labeled class enemies if
they continued their outspoken criticism of the party.23
The Hundred Flowers Campaign ended with widespread

22I b i d .
23Byung-Joon Ahn,
Revolution
(Seattle:
21.

Chinese Politics and the Cultural
University of Washington Press, 1976),

19
investigation of intellectuals,

regardless of the extent of

their participation in the criticism.

The campaign also

brought internal tensions to the C C P .

Many top party leaders

were opposed to the campaign from the beginning,
proved to be a failure,

the tensions

grew.

and once it

24

Chalmers Johnson maintains that although the Hundred
Flowers episode did not do serious damage to the party's
authority,

it appears to have inspired in Mao an ideological

recklessness that had been absent throughout the earlier part
of his career.

The Hundred Flowers Campaign marks the

beginning of the divergence of two belief systems,

that of

the communist revolution and Mao's personal ideology,

a

divergence that appears today to have undone much of what had
been accomplished up to that time.25
After the Hundred Flowers Campaign,

Mao wanted to

implement a program of rapid communization and
industrialization.
campaign,

Just as he had done in the previous

he turned away from the party leaders and went to

the masses to implement his new means of industrialization
and communization.
economic power;

Mao wanted China to become a leading

he wanted to surpass the West and contended

that it was an obtainable goal.

York:

24Tony Saich, China:
St Martin's Press,
25ibid.

In his vision,

the solution

Politics and Government.
1981), 33, 174.

(New
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of the economic

problems in China was to incorporate the idea

of the mass line.
regime,

He believed that a politically strong

utilizing the concepts of Marxism-Leninism,

could

solve any economic problem with previously unseen efficiency.
Thus,

China would be viewed by the rest of the world as a

model to other nations for the speed of its economic
d e v e l o p m e n t .26
His next campaign,

the Great Leap Forward,

stages:

first,

second,

the great leap in industry.

The change
the countryside

had two main

the institution of the commune system,

and

to the commune system took place mainly in
in

the guise of rural land reform.

Mao

fervently believed that if the peasants followed his
directives substantial industrial and agricultural progress
could be made without the aid of farm machinery such as
tractors and combines.

With China's vast population,

he

believed that the goals of the commune system could be
implemented more efficiently than with machinery.
communes'

The

essential principle was to combine several

cooperatives into a commune.

The work would be distributed

from the central planning body of the commune.
system was,

first,

The purpose

to indoctrinate the peasants of China in

the ways of communism,

and second,

to collectivize farm land

26Peter S.H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China
The Do m e stic Scene 1949-1967. (South Orange, N J : Seton Hall
University Press, 1967), 373.
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in the endeavor to make a more proficient agricultural
process.

The inhabitants of the communes were to work,

and sleep together,

eat,

in addition to renouncing all private

possessions,27
In theory, Mao believed that the commune system would be
the most efficient way to inculcate the practice of communism
into the people of the countryside.

C.P. FitzGerald argues

that the campaign was carried out in a manner that made
failure inevitable.

The workers performed their tasks

without questioning the policy of the central authorities.
There was a severe lack of communication between the workers
and the cadres who devised the work schedules,

which resulted

in mismanagement and miscalculations of the actual production
of the communes.

Men had to be moved to unfamiliar farms,

local knowledge and skills were not acknowledged,

and the

advice of experienced farmers was not respected by untrained
cadres,

who were ignorant of proper agricultural techniques.

Because the new program forced the peasants to work land with
which they were unfamiliar,

they did not feel compelled to

point out possible dangers of the cadres' method.

As a

result of the unwillingness of the cadres to listen to the
peasants,

as well as the farmers failure to inform them of

possible hazards to their method of cultivation,

the crops

were often below average and the cadres were not very

27C.P. FitzGerald, Mao Tse-Tung and China
^ cflolmes & Meir Publishers, Inc., 1976), 95-96.

(New York:
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accurate in their assessments of the yield.
grossly exaggerated successes and covered up

In fact, they
- f a i l u r e s . 28

The effects of the miscalculations were staggering.
Natural disasters such as floods and droughts were blamed for
the food shortages,

instead of human errors.

natural calamities,

by order of the Central Committee and the

State Council,

some sixty million people were mobilized for

crash programs in seventeen of the provinces,
the crops.

To combat these

By 1960,

to help salvage

the agricultural situation was critical.

More than half of the arable land, according to the New China
News Agency dispatch of December 30,
drought or flood conditions;
n o n p r o d u c t i v e .29

1960, was affected by

some areas became absolutely

Severe shortages and rationing of food

resulted from the cadres'
droughts and floods.

inefficient management of the

The people had to endure great

hardships in most of the rural areas because of the mistakes
of the governmental officials.30
The second goal of the Great Leap Forward was to bring
about significant advances in industry in an ambitious
attempt to increase China's industrial production to match
that of Great Britain.
Forward,

In the course of the Great Leap

Mao again turned away from the party leaders and

28ibid.,

97-98.

29Tang & Maloney.,
30I b i d .

p. 399.
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went to the masses to implement his campaign just as he had
done in the Hundred Flowers Campaign.

He believed that if

the enthusiasm of the people could be put to work in
industries and farms,

the campaign would flourish.

Although

there was still skepticism on the part of the leaders,

they

exhibited more confidence in this campaign than they had done
with the Hundred Flowers.
The Great Leap Forward was initiated in 1958 and
signified vast changes in economic policies of the C C P .
Until that time Soviet influence had dominated the CCP but
the new policy symbolized one of the first major steps away
from Soviet influence and towards Chinese independence.31
wanted China to be more self reliant.

Mao

He saw the country far

behind the West in terms of industrial development,
wanted to modernize as quickly as possible.

and

However,

his

ambitious vision led to ever greater economic difficulty.
In the first year of the campaign,
Great Leap Forward would be a success:
agricultural production increased.

it appeared that the
industrial and

The downfall began when

the Soviets withdrew their support from China's industry,
leaving a technical void.

The Soviets had intended to make

China a satellite country by devising all its technical,
economic,

and political strategies,

but the Chinese had no

intention of compromising their autonomy to outsiders.

31James R. Townsend, Politics in China
Brown & Company, 1974), 114.

The

(Boston: Little,
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incessant struggle between the two interpretations of
communism finally led to a complete break in relations
between the two nations.32

Chinese workers simply did not

have the technical expertise the Soviets had provided and
there were other developments which also contributed to the
failure of the campaign.

Industries began to decline as a

result of the lack of raw materials,

mismanagement and the

inability of the country to produce quality goods.

By 1960,

China was in a serious economic pr e d i c a m e n t .33
Mao was directly denounced by top party officials for
the failure of the campaign.
Defense Minister,

One of the main critics was

Peng Dehuai,

who condemned Mao for trying

to implement the Great Leap Forward too rapidly,
setting unattainable goals.34

and for

Peng was purged from the CCP

and replaced.35
The failure of the campaign to bring about the positive
economic changes that Mao forecast caused other struggles
within the party.

Factions appeared,

and with the failure of

the Great Leap, Mao lost a great deal of his influence over
the CCP.

As a result of the poor economic conditions from

the Great Leap Forward debacle,
32I b i d ., 112,

the people were poverty

120-23.

33S a i c h ., p . 38 .
34Biographical information on Peng Dehuai in appendix a.
35A h n ., p. 40-44.
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stricken with an estimated 10 to 20 million famine-related
deaths,

and Mao suffered politically and no longer enjoyed

majority support in the party or Central Committee.36
The CCP
the strategy

signified itsindependence from

Mao by rejecting

of the Great Leap and beginning a policy of

economic recovery.

The moderates,

who wanted a more

pragmatic and less ideological approach to China's economic
and political problems,

included economic administrators,

technocrats and specialists.37

He faced strong opposition

from pragmatists led by Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi,

who

wanted the party to be the focus of policy implementation and
participation in a more pragmatic manner and opposed Mao's
mass line approach.38

However,

although he lost a good deal

of support, Mao was always at the forefront of the party.
Mao regained

popularity in the CCP when he addressed the

Tenth plenum

of the Eighth Central Committee in 1962,

stressing the importance of democracy and mass line
participation.

Mao's difference of opinion with the

pragmatists led to his final major campaign,

36Townsend.,

p. 123-26.

Meisner.,

37A.Doak Barnett, China After Mao
Princeton University Press, 1969), 23.

the Great

250.
(Princeton, N J :

38Biographical information for Deng Xiaoping in appendix

a.
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Proletarian Cultural R e vo lut ion .39
Another of Mao's campaigns which was taking place
concurrently with the Great Leap Forward was the Socialist
Education Movement.

This movement originally focused on the

rural peasants but later incorporated the city factory
workers,

intellectuals,

and party cadres.

In 1964,

it was

initiated shortly following the Tenth Plenary session of the
Eighth Central Committee.

The theme of the campaign was to

inform the peasants of the struggle between the socialists
and the capitalists.

In essence,

the movement was outlined

in terms of the class struggle as an inevitable circumstance
of socialist development.40

Mao stated in his communique of

the Tenth Plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party that the road to socialism was
very long and filled with obstacles to block the progression
to the final goal.

Therefore,

the people must be educated to

remain faithful to the movement.41
Subsequently,

Mao developed the Socialist Education

Movement two years after the Tenth Plenary session of the
Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in

39S a i c h ., p .44 .
40Gargi Dutt & V.P. Dutt, China's Cultural Revol ut ion .
(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970),21.
41Communique of the Tenth Plenary session of the Eighth
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, "New China
News Agency, Beijing", 28 September 19 62.
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The goals of this mass education movement were

defined as the use of proletarian ideology to educate and
remold the peasants,

promote closer relations between the

cadres and the masses,
capitalist ideology,

overcome and prevent erosion by

"expose and smash the various plots of

sabotage by the class enemies," and consolidate the
collective economy.

The socialist education campaign also

came to be known as the "four clean-up" movement.
realms to be "cleaned up" were politics,
organization,

The four

ideology,

and economy.43

The target of the campaign was the village cadres who
appeared to be straying away from the goals of the socialist
movement.

Mao insisted that committee chairmen,

accountants,

warehousemen,

and other village managers had

become corrupt and had exploited the peasants.
bribes,

secretaries,

did less manual labor than others,

They took

and ordered the

people to perform tasks for their own ends, making their own
lives better while the peasants gained nothing in return.44
There were severe repercussions as a result of the corruption
of the cadres.

Mao contended that the cadres were guilty of

42The Party was only willing to engage the campaign on a
small scale where as Mao wanted a much larger effort.
Fairbank, 308.
43D u t t , 22.
44Fairbank,

308.
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a grievous deviation from socialist ideals.45
In order to rectify the situation Mao sent in outside
cadres to replace the local officials.

The new cadres

settled in the village for several weeks.

While there,

they

cultivated relations with the peasants who had grievances
against the corrupt c a d r e s .

The officials compiled charges

and evidence against the local cadres,
endless interrogation,

and proceeded to use

physical exhaustion,

confessions as a basis for their verdicts.

and forced
At the

commencement of the Socialist Education Movement,

the cadres

retained a great deal of individual control over their
jurisdictions and Mao's initial goal,

to convince the

peasantry of the rightness of the communist path,
eclipsed by the tenacity of the cadres.

was

Liu Shaoqi and Peng

Zhen had probably foreseen that this would be the result and
had been more willing to accommodate Mao on this campaign.46
To reassert leadership of the countryside,

Mao announced

that the state would clamp down on the free mark et .47

This

decree was not looked upon favorably by the peasants.

In

order to placate the people,

the Central Committee announced

that there would be greater investment in agriculture.

45MacFarquhar,

The

2 95-2 96.

46Biographical information for Peng Zhen in appendix a.
Ibid.
47Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Communism, (Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1969), 204-205.

Mass.
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Great Leap Forward policy had favored industrial development
and neglected the growth of the agrarian sector.

It was

hoped that this equalization would in turn stimulate
industrial production.

Mao had earlier asserted that more

investment in light industry and agriculture would help heavy
industry,

by accumulating more capital faster, which would

benefit the nation's standard of

l i v i n g . 48

Once the Socialist Education Movement was well under way
the next phase of operation was incorporated.

This step was

an active acceleration of indoctrination of the entire nation
in the Mao Zedong's thought,

outlined above.

A Mao-study

movement was broadened from the ranks of the army to embody
the whole country.
For example,

The campaign unfolded through out China.

in the province of Liaoning,

70,000

organizations were set up for promoting the Mao-study
program.

To learn the thought of Mao Zedong became a

compulsion for workers, peasants,
cadres.
one,

intellectuals,

and even

Mao-study was described as the sole method for every

every unit,

and every department to become more

r e v o l u t i o n a r y .49
Mao's ideology was expected to change the spiritual
outlook of the masses in the direction set forth by the
Chairman.

Mao hoped that this exaltation of the movement

48Mao's view on light industry was not shared by the
majority of the Central Committee.
MarFarquhar, 297.
49D u t t , 23.
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would enable him to propel the country to a higher level of
collectivization,
Thus,

which in essence was the Maoist line.

it would diminish any opposition to his policies.

The

idolization of Mao would automatically shut out any criticism
aimed at him by his political rivals.50

This deification of

Mao also had the ultimate objective of him irreproachable and
omniscient.

It would be inconceivable that after all this

glorification,
authority;

anyone could pose a direct challenge to his

his word was law.51

It is extremely important to note that there was a
change in direction for the Socialist movement after this
aspect of the campaign was implemented.
communist country,
leadership.

As a newly emerging

China needed direction and strong

Mao may have advocated this goal through his

speeches and the rhetoric of his campaigns,

but behind this

facade some have seen a more suitable explanation of his
initiatives.

Robert J. Lifton contends that Mao's quest for

revolutionary immortality compelled him to initiate the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Revolutionary immortality is

defined by Lifton as a sense of participating in permanent
revolutionary fermentation,

and of transcending individual

death by "living on" indefinitely within this continuing
revolution.

From this point of view,

50D u t t , 24.
51I b i d .

the sense of

immortality is much more than a mere denial of death;
part of compelling,

it is

life-enhancing imagery binding each

individual person to significant groups and events removed
from him in place and time.

It is the individual's inner

perception of his involvement in what we might call the
historical process.

The sense of immortality may be

expressed biologically,

by living on through one's sons and

daughters and their sons and daughters;

theologically,

in the

idea of a life after death or of other forms of spiritual
conquest of death;

creatively,

through "works" and influences

persisting beyond biological death; through identification
with nature,
space;

and with its infinite extension into time and

or experientially,

through a feeling-state,

experiential transcendence,
temporarily,

so intense that,

it eliminates time and death.

that of

at least
What all this

suggests is that the essence of the "power struggles," is
power over death.52

52Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortal-ity. (New York
Random House: 1968) 7-8.

Chapter II
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

Ostensibly,

the purpose of the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution was to rekindle the revolutionary spirit
of the early days of the Chinese communist m o v e m e n t .

It was

also an attempt to reinstate Maoist policies within the
party,

and test the loyalty of central officials.

campaign brought purges of the central leadership,

The
especially

of intellectuals and those in charge of propaganda and
cultural expression.
Guard,

Widespread attacks were made by the Red

groups of fanatic youths sanctioned by Mao in an

attempt to rejuvenate revolutionary spirit.

The campaign

exploded into mass demonstrations that disrupted society and
eventually degenerated into a program of terror directed at
anyone suspected of anti-Mao sentiments;

it resulted in

violent struggles between the Maoists and the moderates.
Eventually,

even the Red Guard divided into rival factions

and lost much of its power,

leading to the rise of the

"revolutionary rebels," groups of workers who tried to seize
power from outside the party structure.

They too,

divided

33
into different factions,

which resulted in their demise.53

This second chapter will explore six facets of the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution;
Cultural Revolution;

second,

first, the origin of the

the purges,

criticism and anti

western campaign; third, the role of the Red Guard;
the Rise of the Revolutionary Left;
People's Liberation Army;

fifth,

and finally,

fourth,

the Role of the

the Thermidor of the

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.54

This chapter will

argue that the essence of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution was Mao's attempt to regain the power that he had
lost as a result of his failures in the Hundred Flowers
Campaign and the Great Leap Forward.

It will also maintain

that the Cultural Revolution was an ideological struggle
between the Maoists and the pragmatists.

Additionally,

it

will argue that M a o ’s final struggle for power left China in
grave political turmoil without a clearly united party or
Government.

53The notes for the background of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution were taken from the following sources:
Byung-Joon Ahn, Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution.
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 197 6),238-242. Tony
Saich, China: Politics and Government. (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1981),45-71.
James R. Townsend, Politics of
China. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1974), 128-140.
54For a brief explanation of the concept of the
thermador as a phase of revolutions, see note 103, below.
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The

Origin

of

fche

Cultural

Revolution

At the end of Mao's previous campaign,
Forward,

the Great Leap

the country lay in economic turmoil and

leaders blamed Mao for the failure.

party

He had lost a

considerable amount of his political influence over the CCP
and withdrew from the mainstream of politics by giving up the
Chairmanship of the People's Republic and the public eye,
while retaining party prominence as Chairman of the party.
More pragmatic leaders,

such as Liu Shaoqi,

chairman and head of state,
general of the party,
this period,

party vice-

and Deng Xiaoping,

secretary-

gained more control of the CCP.

In

it appeared that Mao's authority had diminished

to the point that party leaders practically ignored Mao's
precepts.

The party reasserted its authority,

and leaders

committed to the pragmatism of the period before the Great
Leap

returned to pr omi n e n c e . 55

performance improved greatly.56

As a result,

China's economic

Mao retreated to his country

home in the Yangtze valley and left the government and the
55Liu Shaoqi became the formal head of state of the
People's Republic, the senior vice-chairman of the Party;
Deng Xiaoping asended to the position of Secretary-General of
the Party.
They were accompanied by the restoration of the
authority of leading Party bureaucrats such as Lu Dingyi,
Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing; and the economic planners who had
been the architects of the First Five Year Plan, such as Chen
Yun, Li Fuchun and Bo I b o . All had been critical of the
policies of the Great Leap and they preoceeded to dismantle
those policies and to return China to a condition of
"n o r m a l c y ."
56Tony Smith, Thinking Like a Co mm u n i s t . (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1987), 126.
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party in the hands of Liu Shaoqi.
withdrawn from public life.

He had appeared to have

In all probability,

he was

planning his next campaign.
Jules Archer states that control of the party had
gradually passed into the hands of pragmatic administrators
and technicians who claimed devotion to Maoist thought,
systematically ignoring its principles.

while

It was Liu Shaoqi

and his supporters in the Central Committee who ran the
infrastructure of the CCP,

the labor unions,

the party

schools and cadre organizations in Mao's name.57

Tang Tsou

characterizes Liu's interpretation of the mass line as being
a leader-follower relationship between the people and the
party.

Unlike Mao,

paternalistic.

Liu regarded his role in the party as

In his view,

the people would respect the

judgment of the government because they were convinced it was
acting in their best interests and for the benefit of China.
Liu's pragmatic explication of the function of the CCP with
respect to the mass line was in striking contrast to that of
Mao,

who appealed directly to the masses and their sense of

dignity,

power,

and importance within the party structure,

and to their tenacious devotion to an omniscient figure.58
Mao saw his idea of the continuous revolution fading
5?Jules Archer,
In c. ,1972), 169.

Mao Tse-Tuncr. (New York:

Hawthorn Books,

58Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao
R e f o r m s . (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986),
74 .
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with the transition to this new order.

He contended that the

current leadership was ignoring his vision for China and was
introducing corrupt Western capitalist ideas into party
ideology.

This contention compelled him to take action. He

decided to initiate a campaign to test the dedication of
party members to continuous revolution,

and to purge the

nation of foreign influences.
Rumors of Mao's failing health spread throughout the
country and to counter these unfounded stories,

Mao announced

to the press that he was going to swim the Yangtze River at
Wuhan.

The Yangtze is regarded by the Chinese who live by

it, or on it, as a death trap for those who fall into its
waters.

The swim in the Yangtze served to publicize the fact

that Mao was still a vibrant leader who was physically fit to
withstand the pressure and stress of being the Chairman of
the CCP .59

The swim symbolized Mao's readiness to return to

the forefront of politics.
Because there were few people he could trust, Mao
enlisted the help of his wife,

Jiang Qing,

and long time

friend Lin Biao to devise and implement the campaign to
purify the p a r t y . 60

In the summer of 1966, Mao had given

Jiang Qing a position on the CCP Central Committee,

and by

autumn she was in charge of organizing a new "cultural
59C.P. FitzGerald, Mao Tse-Tung and China, (New York:
Holes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976), 114-115.
60Biograhpical information for Jiang Qing in appendix A.
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revolution" as one of Lin's deputies.
"reform" Chinese music,

opera,

Her task was to

and art by bringing

practitioners of those arts in line with Maoist thought.
spoke on Radio Beijing to denounce rock music,
impressionism,

She

jazz,

and abstract art as counter-revolutionary

western lures "intended to poison and paralyze the minds of
the peo ple ."61

Mao wanted the people to take pride in their

own culture and discover its superiority to Western ideas.
Through Chinese culture,

he argued,

the people could find the

true path of the continuous revolution which would lead
eventually to Chinese communism.
Mao's fundamental purpose in launching the Cultural
Revolution was to seek out and destroy opponents within the
party and government who,
debauched Western ideas,
products,

he contended,

were infected with

which included owning Western made

and to replace them with loyal and dedicated

supporters.62

In the "Circular of the Central Committee of

the Communist Party of China," 16 May 1966 Mao said,

"There

is no construction without d e s t r u c t i o n ...Destruction means
criticism and repudiation,

it means revolution.

reasoning things out, which is construction.

61Ibid,

It involves

Put destruction

170.

62Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: The
Struggle to Consolidate Power," China Quarterly 41 (JanuaryMarch, 1970):1.
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first,

and in the process you have cons tru cti on ."63

quotation suggests,

as

the

Mao expected that the Cultural Revolution

would identify his enemies.

Once the counter-revolutionaries

had been distinguished from the loyal followers of Mao,

they

would be removed from the party and replaced with true
supporters of the Revolution.64
To carry out the anti-Western campaign, Mao recruited
millions of college and secondary school-aged youths.
Because his leadership had largely been discredited following
the Great Leap Forward,

he needed a new power base.

He

asserted that the youth of China had never known the
hardships of life under imperialism,

fought a war,

or

experienced the exhilaration of making sacrifices for the
revolution.

Simply reading about history,

it from parents,

or hearing about

was a poor substitute for the real thing.

Without proper guidance,

Chinese youth could easily be

corrupted into following a counterrevolutionary path.
Therefore,

in order to maintain the commitment of the young

to the continuous revolution,

Mao sent hundreds of thousands

of students to village communes to work with the peasants to
give them first-hand experience of what it meant to be
committed to the revolution.

The revolutionary youths were

63I b i d .
64Ibid.
Mao's enemies were defined as those who had been
corrupted by Western-bourgeoisie ideals.
This definition was
interpreted very broadly; it will be explained in greater
detail below.
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given the name of the Red Guards.65
million,

Numbering over two

they were soon to strike fear into the hearts of the

Chinese people.

It appeared that no one was immune from

their terror.

Purges I Criticism

and

Anti-Western

Campaign

Mao charged several members of the CCP with possessing
Western views of politics as well as having Western made
products,

which he considered to be treasonous.

The first to

be officially charged with anti-revolutionary ideas was the
Mayor of Beijing,

Peng Zhen.

Early in 1960, Wu Han,

known Peking intellectual and writer,

a well

a member of the CCP and

at that time Vice Mayor of Peking, wrote a play entitled "The
Dismissal of Hai R u i . " 66
Wenyuan,
Mao.

The play was denounced by Yao

a minor literary critic,

a

as a covert attack upon

The drama was set during the Ming dynasty and

celebrated the heroism of a virtuous official deposed by a
tyrannical emperor for having protested the seizure of
peasant

lands by rapacious landlords and corrupt

bu re auc rat s. 67

C.P. FitzGerald argues that the fact that this

65The role the Red Guard will be explored below;
46-52.

see pp.

66Bioghaphical information for Wu Han in appendix A.
67Meisner,

330.
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play was published and performed gave the signal for the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to begin;

those who

tolerated it were singled out by Mao as his opponents to be
purged.

The author of the play was a close comrade of Peng

Zhen, who was himself a devoted friend of Liu Shaoqi.
attack on Wu Han was,

in essence,

leadership of the CCP in general,
part ic ula r.68

therefore,

An

an attack on the

and on Liu Shaoqi in

The purge of Peng Zhen sent a message to top

officials that Mao still retained power,

and that they must

conform to a strict Maoist line if they wanted to remain in
power.

The removal of a relatively low level leader

symbolized the commencement of the power struggle between the
Maoists and the pragmatists,

led by Liu Shaoqi,

polarize the top leadership of the C C P .

which was to

It is important to

note that the officials who were the initial targets of the
campaign had no power in the central government.

Therefore,

they could not constitute any real threat to the regime,

and

the charges that they planned to usurp the leadership would
be utterly absurd unless viewed in the context of a power
struggle between the top leaders.69
Mao continued his assault on the party by accusing it of
attempting to emulate the ways of the Soviet Communist party,

68FitzGerald,

105-106,

115.

69Ellis Joffe, "China in Mid-1966: 'Cultural Revolution'
or Struggle for P o w e r ? , " China Quarterly 27 (July-September
1966) : 128 .

41
which he claimed was corrupting the communist revolution.70
As stated above, the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations
of communism were divergent.

Mao was especially distrustful

of the S o v i e t s ' attempt to dominate China politically as well
as economically.

Mao's suspicion of the Soviets led to the

criticism of top Chinese officials.
Liu of capitalist tendencies;
leadership,

For example,

Mao accused

he equated him with the Soviet

calling him "China's Khrushchev."71

Mao

criticized the Soviet government for ignoring the
dictatorship of the Proletariat and claiming that the Soviet
Union had reached the stage of communism where there was no
class distinction.

Mao contended that the Soviets had a

definite class bifurcation comprised of a ruling elite and
the p r o l e t a r i a t .

Since a class society remained, Mao

asserted that the Soviet Union could not rightfully claim
that it had moved past the first stage of communism.
Therefore,

those Mao believed to be sympathetic to the Soviet

Union were labeled as traitors.
At this stage of the Cultural Revolution,
of 1967,

in the spring

anyone having the slightest involvement with either

the Soviet Union or the West was labeled a counter
revolutionary and a traitor,

and the rapidly growing range of

the campaign grew beyond what could be considered rational.

70Bridgham,
71Smith,

3.

130.

42
Criticisms moved through the

top leadership of the party and

filtered down to the cadres who,

at the grass-roots level,

were charged with the implementation of the party policy and
therefore had great influence over the masses.
Soviet ideas were spread by tainted officials,

If Western or
the integrity

of the continuous revolution would be in danger.

Therefore,

Mao reacted by invoking his doctrine of the mass line,
under its aegis,
from below.

and

inciting the ordinary Chinese to seize power

He authorized the creation on an experimental

basis of a new "Revolutionary Committee," an organ of power
modelled after the Paris Commune.

This Revolutionary

Committee was to consist of a tripartite alliance of
representatives of the revolutionary masses,
of the People's Liberation Army,
cadres.72

representatives

and revolutionary party

It was M a o ’s intention to rely on the Revolutionary

Committees to replace incumbent officials,
level cadres,

especially the low

with people dedicated to the continuous

revolution and Mao Zedong thought.

Again,

Mao was able to

gain a political advantage by appealing to the masses to be
his watchdogs.

By means of the mass-line,

he was able to

purge the opposition of its grass-roots constituents.
The allegations of Western and Soviet ties of party
members brought an end to several political careers.

On the

72Ibid, 3-4.
The revolutionary Party cadres were defined
by Mao as those leading cadres who follow the proletarian
revolutionary line.
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surface,

purging the CCP of foreign influence seemed to be

Mao's major goal of the campaign.

There are, however,

examples of individuals who seemed to be model party members,
who supported Mao and the continuous revolution devoutly,
were purged nonetheless.
member,

For example, Peng Zhen,

but

a Politburo

appeared to be an exemplary party member but was

labeled a counter-revolutionist,
anti-party crime imaginable.73

guilty of practically every

On the other hand Zhen Yun,

another member of the party elite,

openly disagreed with

Mao's policies and could easily have been accused of being a
counter-revolutionary,

just as Peng and countless others had.

He did not fall victim to criticism,

nor was he purged.

The

inconsistency in treatment between Peng and Zhen, two
political figures in similar positions,
ulterior motives.

suggest that Mao had

The elimination of a loyal CCP member on

one hand and the retention of

an apparent party adversary on

the other demonstrates that the party line was not the sole
issue of the campaign.74

The apparently illogical pattern of

the purges and criticisms undermined the stated goals of the
campaign and suggests that Mao staged the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution for the main objective of removing anyone
capable of consolidating enough power within the party to
rival his authority.

73Joffe,
74Ibid,

126.
127.

Mao had risen from his political
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retreat and illness during the post-Great Leap Forward
period;
CCP.

he was determined to retain power as Chairman of the

Therefore,

everyone was suspected of being his enemy

and no one was immune from the threat of being attacked or
purged.

Mao used the campaign as a political tool to remove

any individual who had the potential of gaining enough
support to break Mao's control of the party.
Another institution Mao believed to be laden with
traitors was the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
been suspicious of intellectuals,

Mao had always

especially scholars in

philosophy and the social sciences.

The Cultural Revolution

presented him with an excellent opportunity to question the
loyalty of a great many of his long time foes.

Virtually all

academic staff and many administrators of the Academy of
Science were criticized in varying degrees.

Those guilty of

the most serious "crimes" were placed in special compounds or
fields and made to do the lowest menial work.

They were also

subjected to constant ridicule and h umi lia ti on. ^

Mao further

used the campaign to test his theory of Red and E x p e r t .
Trong R. Chai maintains that party members with more advanced
degrees were less likely to be purged or attacked than those

75"Foreign Expert", "Eyewitness of the Cultural
Revolution," China Quarterly 28 (October-December 1966) : 3.
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with only bachelor's degrees.76

This suggests that Mao used

the lower level intellectuals as pawns to intimidate the
higher officials of the Chinese Academy of Sciences,
demonstrating to them that he possessed supreme executive
power and that if they were unwilling to capitulate,

they

would be subjected to the same political attacks as their
junior colleagues.
Another purpose of the criticism of the intellectuals
was to make a show of strength by groups outside the party
structure.

To further his appeal to the masses,

Mao wanted

to turn the grievances of underprivileged groups against the
"establishment" of party committees,
especially high intellectuals.

educators,

and

Tsou contends that the

Cultural Revolution was a revolt of those outside the
establishment against the establishment,
sector of it.
inspired,

or at least a large

He goes on to argue that the campaign was

supported and manipulated by the supreme leader to

perpetrate his crusade to attain revolutionary immortality.77

The

Red

Guard

The ostensible purpose of the mass line was to

76Trong R. Chai, "The Chinese Academy of Sciences in the
Cultural Revolution: A Test of the 'Red and Expert' Concept,"
The Journal of Politics 43 (November, 1981): 1220.
77Tsou,

76.
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incorporate the people in the political process rather than
simply having them put their faith in the leadership.

Mao

wanted to use the masses as his constituents and as a powerbase outside the C C P .
support,

Once he had gained their trust and

he could incorporate them into the party and thus

reestablish his political authority.
of gaining grass roots support,
the Red Guard.

To accomplish his goal

Mao turned to the young,

to

The involvement of the Red Guard would prove

to be extremely damaging to China as a whole.

John King

Fairbank characterizes it as being composed of inexperienced
youth who were trying to learn revolution by making
revolution,

and causing great destruction in their w ake.78

The Red Guard movement was initiated in 1966.

Both Mao

and Lin Biao encouraged college and high school students to
band together to carry out the task of eliminating of the old
capitalist ways.79

They were to attack and discredit

opposition elements within the CCP.80

Students throughout

China were enthusiastic to join for a variety of r e a s o n s .
Inclusion in the movement gave members a sense of power and
purpose and a heightened feeling of acceptance by their p e e r s .
For those who were more devoted to Mao's purpose,

78Fairbank,

the crusade

324.

79Biographical information for Lin Biao in appendix A.
80Richard W. Wilson and Amy A. Wilson, "The Red Guards
and the World Student Movement, " The China Quarterly 42
(April-June 1971): 89.
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was seen to be a truly fulfilling experience.

Others

perceived the Red Guard as an opportunity to leave the
countryside,

to escape the tortuous lifestyle of a peasant.

Some viewed the organization as a chance to vent pent up
anger at society and the government because of career
limitations,

work assignments and a sensed discrimination

concerning poor educational or family background.

The

opportunity for status and the thrill of leadership were also
clearly essential components to the group's appeal.81
youths

Why

joined the Red Guard was at first of little

consequence,

but as the movement proceeded,

the differences

played an important r o l e .
As stated earlier,

the goal of the Red Guard was to

attack the old ways and purge the party of any non-Chinese
influences.
such as,

Their organizational texts included statements

"We must remold the being of the people.

We must

defeat the handful of power-holders in the party who take the
capitalist road.
reactionary line."

We must also criticize and discredit their
The manuals also contained proclamations

that Mao was the supreme leader of China and that Mao Zedong
thought was the official ideology of the p a r t y .82
The modus operandi of the Red Guard was to carry out
public attacks on those elements in society who were regarded

81Ibid,

90.

82Ibid,

91-92.
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as capitalists and counter-revolutionaries.

These attacks

consisted of parading the accused through the streets
attired in dunce caps and placards that stated their crimes
against society.

The Red Guard also held mass rallies to

vilify and condemn the authorities said to have taken the
capitalist road and paraded with the infamous big character
po st e r s . 83

These were hung in universities,

buildings and other public places,

government

and were carried through

the streets to broadcast the crimes of the counter
revolutionaries.

During the first week of the movement in

May of 1966, the posters were torn down and the students were
disciplined,

but Mao later applauded the posters as a sign of

the rejuvenation of the revolutionary spirit.

The movement

ultimately incorporated over 2 million students;

such was

their status that exams were postponed so as not to stifle
their revolutionary fervor.84
The group most susceptible to the attacks of the Red
Guard were the inte lle ctu al s.

Because many university

professors had ventured outside China in the course of their
research,
Western,

it was easy to accuse them of being corrupted by
bourgeois views.

Several intellectuals were driven

to suicide as a result of being shamed in front of their

83I b i d .
84Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After.
Free Press, 1986), 334.

(New York:

The

49
peers and subordinates.85
In addition to attacking Western ideas, the Red G u a r d s ’
second goal was to purge China of the "Four O l d s ."
were:

old ideas,

old culture,

old customs,

These

and old habits.

The Four Olds were associated with the exploiting classes,
those who were determined to corrupt the masses,
their minds,

and stage a comeback.86

as elements of traditional,
thought,

capture

The Four Olds were seen

pre-revolutionary Chinese

which could arise anywhere.

The Four Olds were

deptected as a threat to the continuous revolution.

Thus,

the Red Guard went out among the people to seek out the Four
Olds and eliminate them from society,

removing the potential

for a rejuvenation of the old bourgeois ways.87
The Four Olds concept granted the Red Guard free reign
to destroy anything or anyone they defined as bourgeois.
Attacks were aimed at hundreds of thousands of victims.
many cases,

In

the people being attacked were simply older than

the students,

because the Red Guards were highly suspicious

of anyone from a different generation;

they contended that

older people had been corrupted by the past and were not
truly dedicated to continuous revolution.

The Red Guard

maintained that all people who held authority should be

85Ibid.
86Ibid,

336-337,

87Ibid,

337.

and Townsend,

133.
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removed because they had grown complacent in their positions
and were reverting to old ways.88

Some of their victims may

have been singled out just because they were disliked for
personal reasons.
At the outset of the Red Guard movement,
their efforts.

With this official sanction,

Mao praised
and facilitated

by the closure of High schools and Universities

in the fall

of 1966 through the summer of 1968, Red Guard organizations
mushroomed,

bringing millions of young people into the

streets to demonstrate support for Chairman Mao,
and terrorize those said to be his opponents,

to denounce

and to destroy

various symbols of bourgeois or reactionary culture.89
However,

as the campaign progressed the cohesion of the

group began to dissolve.
Maoist or revisionist,
competitive,

Members differed on who was truly

thus the Red Guard broke into

and even hostile,

factions,

a development

naturally encouraged by government officials who were under
a t tac k.90

This division of the Red Guard demonstrated to the

party that Mao's campaign to recommit the country to the idea
of the continuous revolution and to purge China of Western
influences was not wholly sound.

88Tsou,

The mass line,

which was

82 .

89James R. Townsend and Brantly Womack, Politics in China
3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), 134.
90Ibid,

135.
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the basis of Mao's doctrine,

provided no foundation for

making distinctions among competing Maoist groups.
This degeneration of the campaign was enlightening to
members of the CCP who had questioned Mao's crusade from the
start.

In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution they

were unable to take action to prevent Mao from carrying out
his struggle;

later they realized that if the Cultural

Revolution were allowed to continue it would lead to utter
chaos.

These members of the CCP believed that,

once the

people understood that the Cultural Revolution was merely a
show of power,

an attempt by Mao to regain the leadership of

China and to attain revolutionary immortality,

they would

reject the campaign as a political game and demand a more
pragmatic and realistic government.91
Mao had relied upon a group of people who were not
actually committed to his i d e a s .

A large segment of the Red

Guard saw the movement as a way to achieve personal goals and
did not truly believe in the ideology of the campaign.92

They

saw the Cultural Revolution as a way to vent aggression
against those who held power over them.

Mao gave them

license to denounce those people as counter-revolutionaries.
Furthermore,

although they had carried out the Maoist

injunction to awaken the masses,

91Meisner,
92Ibid.

340 .

they often aroused workers

52
and peasants to defend the existing order against the
youthful,

and often arrogant, Red Guards.

lack of discipline,

The almost total

the violent factionalism,

and the

vandalism and hooliganism that characterized the movement led
Maoist authorities in Beijing to conclude that the Red Guards
had become a political liability.

In 1967 stringent measures

were taken to remove "the vanguard" of the Cultural
Revolution from the center of the political stage.93

The

excesses of the Red Guard left a lasting impression on the
people of China.

The

Rise

of

the

Revol u t i o n a r y

Laffc

Even after Mao recognized that the Red Guard was a
liability,

he called for a broader based movement to

incorporate the country as a whole,

a movement to consolidate

the political and economic aspects of the campaign.94

He

wanted to execute the program in a major economic center to
prove that it was viable as a policy.
Cultural Revolution was,

therefore,

The next phase of the

a movement in Shanghai

which was labeled the "January Revolution."
To alleviate the problems that the Red Guard had caused,
Mao called upon the mass line to take over not only the

93Ibid.
94Townsend,

135.
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counter revolutionaries,
production.

but to seize the means of

Philip Bridgham contends that the expansion of

the Cultural Revolution into the government and the economy
caused increasing resistance which,

in mid-December 1966,

led

to a final test of strength when Mao admonished his
supporters to "seize power" in all party,

government and

economic organizations which continued to resist.95

With

Mao's command to the workers to take control of China's labor
organizations,

the stage was set for the outbreak in Shanghai

of what has come to be known as the January Revolution.96
On January 5, 1967 a dozen rebel organizations loosely
allied with the worker's Headquarters published a "Message to
All the People of Shanghai" in the city's leading newspaper
Wen-Hui-pao,
before.

which had been taken over by insurgents two days

The message deplored the divisions within the

revolutionary movement,
factories,

appealed to workers to return to the

and called for the unity of workers,

intellectuals and cadres.

students,

On the following day more than a

million citizens gathered to hold a mass meeting in the
central city square.

The mayor of Shanghai and other high

city party officials were denounced,

removed from their

95Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967:
The Struggle to Seize Power," China Quarterly 30 (April-June,
1968): 8.
96At this stage of the Cultural Revolution, groups
advocating the mass line were also refereed to as the
Revolutionary Left. Ibid.
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positions,

and forced to make public confessions of their

political sins.

Over the next few days,

other officials and

cadres were paraded through the streets with dunce caps and
placards .97
Rule over Shanghai came too quickly for the
Revolutionary Left; they were too inexperienced to carry out
the duties of the government.
chaotic,

unmanageable city,

Shanghai turned into a

overrun by Mao's supporters who

lacked adequate organizational skills to maintain any
semblance of order.

Shanghai was not the only major

municipality to experience this overthrow from the workers.
Nearly all major cities and provinces were affected by the
January Revolution and the "seize power" movement,

and local

governments accross China soon ground to a ha l t . 98

Xhs

Bals

q£

the -g.aaglera

Liberation

Army

Turmoil increasingly characterized China's politics in
the spring of 1967; wide-spread strikes crippled the economy.
Perhaps Mao saw no alternative to the People's Liberation
Arm y

(PLA) to regain control of the cities.

Perhaps he

forsaw that the PLA would become involved one way or the
other,

and called on the PLA in order to ensure that he would

97Meisner,
98Ibid,

9.

346-347.
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retain control of the situation,

since the Army would seem to

be the natural ally of Liu Shaoqi and the pragmatists,
perhaps Mao's decision to call in the Army was aimed at
cutting off

the pragmatists from this action.

reason,

and Lin directed the PLA to assist the

Mao

Revolutionary Left in their struggle
economy and

Whatever the

to gain control of the

local governments of the major metropolitan a r e a s .

They did not intend the army to fight against the people,
buts ecame more turbulent,

the military became more prominent

in administering the government and the e c o n o m y . "

The PLA

entered factories and communes to institute discipline in
order to recover production of goods and s e r v i c e s .
revolutionary committees were established,

Where

it was usually the

military that assumed the dominant position in the tripartite
alliance,

more often than not siding with the old cadres

rather than the representatives of mass organizations.100
The fact that the PLA was willing to solicit the
assistance of the deposed cadres was symbolic of the ebbing
tide of the Cultural Revolution.

The leaders of the army

realized from the outset that the unorganized mass line was
incapable of maintaining a workable government.101

Therefore,

the PLA interpreted its role in the campaign as an order-

"Meisner,

351.

10°Ibid.
101Bridgham,

12.
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restoring organization that would suppress the strikes,
overcome the pronounced tendency towards anarchy which had
characterized the behavior of the Revolutionary Left during
the January Revolution,
government and

economy.

and re-establish a functional
102

in addition to restoring order in

the government and in the economy, military leaders decided
to rehabilitate deposed CCP cadres to make use of their
administrative skills.

The PLA therefore emphasized humane

treatment of party officials.103
The decision in favor of military intervention was both
momentous and incongruous,

for now the PLA,

bureaucratic agency of the state apparatus,

the most
was called upon

to promote what was supposed to be a popular revolutionary
movement against bureaucratic elitism.104

The Cultural

Revolution was in an extreme political crisis.

Mao was

forced to turn to those whom he had originally denounced as
counter-revolutionaries to save China from complete disarray.
With standards changing so quickly,

months passed during

which virtually no social forms could be described as stable.
Criticisms of those in authority extended to virtually all
government leaders;

violent clashes took place between

contending groups within the Red Guards and Revolutionary

102I b i d .
103Ibid,

11.

104Meisner,

350.
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Rebels;

there was massive shifting of sides amidst a sea of

ideological fervor and opportunism;

and there was

considerable breakdown in work schedules,

transportation,

communications throughout various parts of the country.

and
It

became difficult indeed for anyone to be certain which group
was furthering revolutionary immortality.105

The

Thermidor

of

the

Cultural

R e v o l u t i o n 1°6

Mao's genius for survival led him to reverse his field
when he saw the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution out of
control.

He called upon the PLA to regain control of China's

shattered government and economy.

To retain legitimacy,

hailed the PLA as a people's army,

formed and led by himself,

and commanded by Vice Supreme Commander Lin B iao.107

he

He

wanted the masses to surrender control of the bureaucracy to
the a r m y .
By late summer of 1967, the campaign had degenerated so

105Lifton,

140.

106Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of R ev ol u t i o n , rev. ed.
(New York: Vintage, 1965), 205-236.
Brinton defines
Thermidor as "a convalescence from the fever of revolution."
It is a retreat from the goals of the revolution.
Once the
revolution has been won the focus is shifted from fighting
the battles to implenting the policies and administrating the
daily function of government.
It is also a chance for the
people to return to a regular pattern and lead more stable
lives.
107Meisner,

357.
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completely that the Cultural Revolution Group,
Mao appointed to carry out the campaign,
group included Wang Li, Guan Feng,
Lin Bia o . 108

collapsed.

Qi Benyu,

This

Chen Boda and

They were arrested on M a o ’s order,

ultra-leftist approach of the campaign.

the members

due to the

In May of 1967, Mao

had altered the direction of the movement to a more moderate
course;

and, those who did not follow the new policy were

branded ultra-leftists and eliminated from the Cultural
Revolutionary Group.109

He had succeeded in eliminating any

possible political rivals and had regained the political
prominence that he had sought in the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.110
Things were changing at such a rapid pace that it was
difficult for the people to comprehend exactly what was
taking place,

and they were confused as to the proper

interpretation of Maoist thought.

They questioned how one

should distinguish between genuine and counterfeit Red
Guards.

Further,

they asked if the Shanghai Commune was to

be an ideal model for all of China,

what was one to think of

the Triple Alliance which replaced it just a few days after
it came into being.

For most Chinese,

the path to

108Biograhpical information for Wang Li, Guan Feng,
Benyu and Chen Boda in appendix A.
109Ibid,

358.

110Bridgham,

23.
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revolutionary immortality had become obscured and enduring
emotional commitment was close to impossible.111
With the campaign moving in a more pragmatic path, Mao
continued his purge of the u l t r a - l e f t .

The struggle had made

the people weary and the goals of the Revolution became
blurred in the haze of a political struggle that they no
longer supported.112

People who had once led the battle

against Western corruption turned politically passive,

and

many of their organizations disintegrated or became dormant.
Consequently,

in the fall of 1968, the tumultuous period of

the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution came to a close,
leaving Mao,

supported by the PLA, to rebuild China's

government.
With the political situation stabilized and the
radicalism of the mass movement stifled,

the CCP central

committee convened its twelfth plenum in October of 1969.
The main business was to recognize that Mao had once again
unrivaled leadership of the party.

This was done by the

formal expulsion of Liu Shaoqi from the party,
publicly announced at the end of the month.

a decision

It was further

announced that Liu had been removed from all his official
appointments,
Republic,

including that of chairman of the People's

a government position he formally owed not to the

1:L1Lifton,
112Meisner,

140.
361.
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CCP but to the National People's Congress.

The charge was

that Liu had followed a "capitalist road" and was a
"renegade,

traitor,

and scab" and a secret agent of the

Guomindang who had consistently betrayed the party since
1922. Now it could be suggested that the Liuist deviation was
an alien intrusion.

The struggle between the "two lines"

could be reduced to a struggle between revolutionaries and
counter-revolutionaries,
the whole,

between a proletarian party that,

on

had maintained its revolutionary purity and enemy

agents who had infiltrated its ranks from the outside.113

His

main adversary had finally been removed from the political
scene and Mao was now the unquestioned leader of the Chinese
Communist Party,
complete.

113Ibid,

363.

his victory over the pragmatists was

Chapter

III

g-j

Analysis of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

This chapter will describe the final stages of the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution by exploring three aspects of
Mao's decline:

first, Mao's fall from prominence;

the struggle for power among factions; third,
the moderates.

second,

the triumph of

Then it will argue that the campaign was a

short-term political victory for Mao, who regained his party
prominence,
modernize,

but a long-term failure, by a man who refused to
a failure which had devastating and lasting

effects on China.

Finally,

it will be argued that Mao's

obsession with revolutionary immortality was the major
impetus for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

M a p ’s EalI

From

Prominence

The cult of personality that emerged around Mao,
legendary Chairman and revolutionary commander,
essence,

grew,

the
in

into a religion from the start of the Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966,
the beginning,

until his death.

In

the cult flourished on the basis of the

genuine revolutionary fervor of the m a ss es. 114

Mao claimed

victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,

though

it is clear now that little was actually accomplished by the
chaotic and costly campaign.

114Meisner,

363.

Mao's personal authority
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it is clear now that little was actually accomplished by the
chaotic and costly campaign.
continued,

Mao's personal authority

as during the campaign,

to serve as the

legitimator of policy; party leaders stressed Maoist concepts
such as self-reliance,
revolution.

the mass line and the continuing

Official statements asserted that the Great

Cultural Revolution was still in progress,

and that Chinese

society was still engaged in a fierce struggle between the
Maoist and revisionist lines.

This radical rhetoric

discouraged realistic national policies and plans to move
China forward.

It encouraged,

instead,

an experimental

approach that permitted much local diversity and aimed more
at reform of thought and behavior than at attainment of
quantifiable targets.115
The Ninth Party Congress,
1969,

which convened in April of

officially declared that Mao was the indisputable

leader of the CCP.

This was clearly a sign that Mao had in

fact not accomplished his goals but it was an attempt by the
party to put an end to the campaign.

In addition,

party

leaders maintained that they would execute reform measures in
accordance with Mao's objectives,

but the implementation of

Mao's resolutions did not come to fruition for a number of
reasons.
purged,

First,

the majority of top officials had been

and the replacements were not united in their

115Townsend,

137 .
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interpretation of the Cultural Revolution's legacy; they soon
succumbed to renewed factional conflict.

Second,

the

institutional uncertainty and disarray produced by the
campaign complicated efforts to advance new policies.116
Finally,

the CCP leadership faced a succession crisis: their

aging leader was near death,

and there was no clear choice of

a successor.
Deng Xiaoping was selected by the party leaders to take
the political reins after Mao's death but the Gang of Four,
the last of the Maoist supporters,
top party leadership.

thwarted Deng's rise to

This appointment by the party was

another sign that Mao had lost his imfluence over the CCP.
Consequently,

it became obvious that the appraisal and

reappraisal of Mao might continue for generations.
post mort em analysis of his policies took place,
began to deteriorate rapidly.

For example,

goal had been to liberate the rural masses,

As the

his image

if Mao's true
how could he have

stood by while starvation and death befell so many of them?
Was he more interested in power than in economic progress?
The evidence suggests that Mao's objective was more political
than economic,

and that the CCP revolution was a drive for

power by a group dedicated to unifying and controlling China.
On their way up, their publicized aim was liberation and a
new democracy.

116Ibid

Once in power,

however,

their objective began
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to shift toward retaining power.

Eventually this led to a

factional power struggle and Mao's class-struggle ideology
became an abstraction,

an instrument in the conflict,

not

connected with a realistic goal.117

The Power

Struggle..,Among ..Factions; the

Gang of Four

Scarcely had the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party closed in April 1969, proclaiming the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution a glorious triumph and having declared
itself a congress of "unity and victo ry ," when new political
struggles erupted to shatter such "unity" as had been
achieved.

The struggles revolved around the issues raised

during the Cultural Revolution

(and left unresolved)

and were

inflamed by the political passions that the great upheaval
continued to arouse.

But unlike the days of the Cultural

Revolution itself, when the masses were involved in battles
against bureaucratic authority,

Chinese politics now reverted

to factional strife among Communist leaders of the
bureaucracy,

entirely hidden from public v i e w . 118

This

section and the next two sections will explore the three main
rival factions and their struggles for power,
Gang of Four,

Lin Biao and the military,

117Fairbank,
118Meisner,

340-341.
397.

including the

and finally,

the
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moderates.
By 1972, Mao was grew increasingly feeble.
longer able to make public appearances;
Forbidden City,

He was no

he withdrew to the

away from public life. Mao's supporters were

still in top party positions,

however,

and their political

survival was dependent on the patronage and support of the
ailing Mao.
Chunqiao,
Commune;

The most prominent of his followers were Zhang

the self-appointed leader of the abortive Shanghai
Yao Wenyuan,

a radical who wrote a celebrated

article announcing the opening of the Cultural Revolution;
Wang Hongwen,

the former Shanghai textile worker whom the

Tenth Congress of 1973 had placed near the top of the party
hierarchy;

and Jiang Qing, Mao's wife,

who was instrumental

in the opening of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revol ut ion .119

Later known as the Gang of Four,

members of the politburo and two
standing committee.

they were all

(Zhang and Wang)

For the most part,

were in the

their control was

confined to the cultural realm and to the official media,
which in any system are extremely influential because they
are a direct link to the masses.

By means of the media,

the

Gang of Four was able to communicate its political
perspective to the majority of the Chinese people.

The Gang

of Four also had in its arsenal a devoted secret police
force,

comprised of loyal supporters and separate from the

119Biograhpical information for Zhang Chunqiao,
YaoWenyuan and Wang Hongwen in appendix A.
Meisner,

419.
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ordinary police,

which was dispatched to terrorize those who

were labeled counterrevolutionary rightists.120

The two main

objectives of the Gang were to represent the interests of the
new cadres who had been brought in during the Cultural
Revolution to support Maoist principles and to oust Deng
Xiaoping from his position as Vice Premier.

The Gang seized

the opportunity of Zhou Enlai's funeral to express its
disdain for the Vice Premier.

Deng was given the honor of

delivering Zhou's eulogy, but this was one of his last public
appearances as the Vice Premier.

Wall posters denounced him

as China's Khrushchev and a leader of a capitalist movement.
Jiang Qing charged him with being an international capitalist
agent.
The campaign against Deng continued with the Gang
accusing him of being responsible for riots on the national
day of mourning at Tienanmen Square in the center of Beijing,
which had been the site of massive rallies by the Red Guard
only a decade before.

This incident came about when several

thousand mourners came to pay their respects to the fallen
leader Zhou.

The Maoists attempted to disperse the immense

crowd and this action incensed the multitude of mourners,
subsequently began to riot.

who

The violence was kept to a

minimum because some of the troops sent in to maintain order
were sympathetic to the crowd.

120Meisner.,

422.

The protest would later
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become a symbol of articulation of discontent in a seemingly
despotic state.

The Maoists,

however,

different view of the occurrence.

harbored a quite

The Party Politburo

labeled the riot as a demonstration by counter
revo lu t i o n a r i e s .

Deng bore the brunt of the blame and was

removed from power.

There was an appeal to the masses to

take part in a campaign to denounce Liu, but to the dismay of
the Gang of Four,

few showed their support for the criticism.

There was a wave of secret police repression,

and tens of

thousands were arrested as alleged counter-revolutionaries.121
On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died and the moderates
wasted little time severing their ties with the radical
Maoists.

In early October,

with the period of mourning for

the late Chairman barely concluded,
Gang of Four,
positions.

the last remaiming Maoists in top party

They were seized and accused of having conspired

to commandeer state power,
charges.

the politburo purged the

Hua Guofeng,

among a vast melange of other

a moderate,

assumed Mao's post as

Chairman of the CCP.122
The era of Mao had drawn to a close.
severe economic and political p r o b l e m s .

He left China with
Dedicating itself to

121The notes for the Gang of Four were taken from Meisner,
418-428, and Jurgen Domes, "The 'Gang of Four' and Hua
Guofeng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76," China
Quarterly 71 (September-December, 1977): 473-497.
122Biographical information for Hua Guofeng in appendix A.
Meisner, 426.
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a more pragmatic style of policy, the CCP leadership
including Hua Guofeng was determined to restore the economic
program of the post-Great Leap Forward period,

and one of its

first courses of action was to initiate a rectification
campaign to reinstate officials purged during the tumultuous
period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Lin

Biao's

Last

In 1969,

Stand

Lin Biao had reached the number two spot in

the party next to Mao and was designated successor to the top
leadership position.

Lin brought the military into

increasing prominence in both party and government.

While

the military was divided between the Central Military Command
at Beijing and the regional commands in the provinces,
General Lin Biao,

PLA Chief of Staff, was Mao's designated

s u c c e s s o r .123
Shortly,
example,

differences arose between him and Mao.

For

Mao wanted to bring about the rapid restoration of

the party,

which was for him the first and most essential

order of domestic bu siness.124

In the later stages of the

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,

the PLA had become the

dominant force in the political life of the nation and Mao

123Fairbank,
124Meisner,

334 .
400.
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wanted to de-emphasize its role in favor of a more
bureaucratized system of government.
the restoration of old cadres.

Lin Biao was opposed to

The more the party was

strengthened through the return of pre-Cultural Revolution
officials,

the less power Lin Biao had.

fall of 1969,

at the Ninth Congress,

Consequently,

in the

Lin proposed that the

policies implemented in the early stages of the Cultural
Revolution should continue to be in use.

Lin did not have

any strong base of support in the Party Congress;
proposal was unsuccessful,
and Mao.

his

and resulted in a rift between Lin

Mao began to suspect Lin of personal ambitions.

According to Mao,

Lin and his cohort Chen Boda carried out a

surprise attack at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress of
the Central Committee known as the Lushan meeting.

This

attack consisted of speeches critical of the foreign and
domestic policies of Zhou Enlai,

surprising only because

their content was not discussed with Mao
As a result of Lin's power move,

b e f o r e h a n d . 125

moderates criticized

him for obstructing the process of party rebuilding.
Moreover,

the Party Congress endorsed new foreign policies

designed by Zhou Enlai which were based on peaceful
coexistence between countries with different social systems.
Still,

Lin Biao was a formidable polical force.

He was not

only Mao's official heir apparent and China's Minister of

izsibid,

402.
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Defense,

had emerged from the Cultural Revolution with a

popular prestige seemingly second only to that of the
Chairman himself.

Dating back to the Long March,

Lin had

been one of the great heroes and leaders of the Chinese
Revolution and one of Mao's closest comrades.

Further,

the

extent of military support Lin commanded was unknown in
autumn of 1970.
Lin Biao strongly supported the Cultural Revolution but
it was widely apparent that the CCP had taken a major turn
away from these ideologically based policies in favor of more
pragmatic methods of running the country.

Following the

Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee at Lushan, Mao
set up party committees in all the provinces,

effectively

subordinating the provincial revolutionary committees,
had been endorsed by the General.126

Lin,

it was clear,

which
no

longer subscribed to M a o ’s views; his subsequent removal from
power was inevitable.
or simply.

This,

however,

would not come cleanly

A power struggle ensued between Mao and Lin which

ended rather mysteriously.
According to Maurice Meisner,

Lin Biao plotted a coup

d'etat that involved an attempt to assassinate Mao Zedong.
document known as "Outline of the
the plan to murder the Chairman,

'571 Project'",

supposedly

stated that the plotters

"planned to attack Chairman M a o ’s special train with

126Ibid,

404 .

A
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flamethrowers and bazookas,

dynamite the Shuofang railway

bridge near Suzhou over which the train was scheduled to
pass, bomb the train from the air or blow up the oil depot
near the stop of the train in Shanghai."127

If this plan

failed, the Chairman was to be shot by a member of his own
bodyguard when he reached Shanghai.
fruition.

The plan never came to

Zhou Enlai acknowledged in a meeting with a group

of American newspaper editors in Late 1972 that the "571
Project" was never put into operation.

There was,

in fact,

no attempt on Mao's life and no effort to carry out the
alleged coup;

instead,

fearing the plot had been discovered,

Lin hastily fled on the ill-fated plane that crashed in
Mongolia.

Whatever Lin Biao's motives,

purge of his supporters in the party,
committees,

his demise,

PLA,

and the

and revolutionary

removed the last barriers to the consolidation of

the post-Cultural Revolution order which Mao and Zhou
designed.128

The

Triumph

of

the

Moderates

Elite conflict in the 1970s combined elements of both
the initial and latter stages of the Cultural Revolution.
Generally,

leaders tried to contain conflict,

127Ibid,

406.

128Ibid,

406.

to avoid open
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charges and mass mobilization in their struggles and to keep
purges secret until after the event; the two key purges,

of

Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, brought mass criticism
campaigns only after the victors had acted against their
targets.
By 1972,

Zhou was the active party leader,

increasingly withdrew from public life.129

as Mao

Zhou supported a

policy of reinstating in their original positions cadres who
had been purged in the course of the Cultural Revolution.
These reinstated cadres effectively replaced those who had
taken their posts during the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution by 1973.

Mao supported this policy,

attempting to

balance the radical and moderate factions of the par ty .130

He

maintained that China could utilize their skills as
experienced bureaucrats.

The decline of Mao's ideologically

based policies made possible more moderate and pragmatic
approaches.

China desperately needed a leader who could

formulate programs designed to deal with her real and
pressing political and economic problems.
Zhou's tenure as Premier lasted from 1972 until his
death in January 1976.
the PLA,

Deng Xiaoping,

now Chief of Staff of

who had essentially taken over Zhou's duties during

the premier's illness,

129Townsend,
i30Meisner,

323.
409.

was unable to consolidate power and
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Mao denied him

the premiership.

Still holding some political

reins, Mao was

unwilling to let

radicals have complete control.

either the moderates or the
Consequently,

Hua Guofeng

became premier

as a compromise between the competing

factions.

position was not

His

solid, however,

claims that he was Mao's personal choice.

despite his

H u a 's main

objective was to consolidate the factions and once again to
have a united party.
After the purge of the Gang of Four,
broad coalition.

the CCP rested on a

The CCP leadership enjoyed prominent support

from the military,

in spite of the Lin Biao disaster; the

majority of the factionalized PLA sided with the moderates.
The moderates,

called for the restoration of Deng.

Hua

initially resisted restoring Deng to his previous party and
government positions but was eventually persuaded and he and
Deng maintained a working relationship in advancing
modernization policies.
between Hua and Deng,

There were evident differences

however,

with Hua emphasizing

intellectual and educational reforms and Deng more emphatic
about the need for economic,

scientific,

and technical

a d v a n c e s .131
Deng and his supporters became more aggressive in 1978,
pushing for further diminution of Mao's stature and demotion
of several Politburo members associated with Deng's 197 6

131I b i d ., 326.
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setback.

For example, Wu De, the mayor of Beijing,

who had

led the suppression of the Tiananmen demonstration and
subsequent criticism of Deng,

was removed from office.

Others to fall victim to Deng's wrath were Chen Xilian,
commander of the Beijing military region,

Ji Dengkui, party

ideologist of the Beijing region and Wang Dongxing,

member of

the Politburo Standing Committee and the head of the security
establishment.132

Since removal of these men would strip Hua

of much of his Politburo support, the campaign suggested that
Deng might be seeking Hua's post.

Deng's supporters openly

criticized the crack down on the April Fifth Movement and
denounced the Cultural Revolution, but stopped short of
condemning Mao's entire post-1965 career.

These themes were

also very threatening to Hua, whose position rested very
heavily on Mao's endorsement and the Tiananmen affair.133
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee,
in December 1978,

held

confirmed Deng's political ascendancy to

Chief of Staff of the PLA and began a major new phase of
Chinese politics.

In addition to endorsing many demands

associated with him,

reversal of the Tiananmen verdict,

continued rehabilitation of veteran cadres,
criticism of the Cultural Revolution,

the stronger

the Plenum added

several of Deng's supporters to the Politburo and to other
132Biographical information for Chen Xilian,
and Wang Dongxing in appendix A.
133I b i d ., 327.

Ji Dengkui
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high state and party posts.

There was compromise,

too,

as

Hua initially retained his leading positions and considerable
Politburo support; however,

the victory of Deng,

rather than

the compromise with Hua, turned out to be the lasting result
of the Third Plenum.

Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi were

posthumously rehabilitated.

Criticism of Mao and the

Cultural Revolution increased in volume and in severity.
This had a direct impact upon Hua Guofeng because he was the
last remaining leader from the Mao Zedong era.

The criticism

marked the final stage of Hua's decline in power.
the premiership to Zhao Ziyang in 1980.134

He ceded

In 1982, the post

of party chairman was abolished and Hua lost his Politburo
seat

(although as of 1985, he still retained a seat on the

Central Committee).135
The Maoist era had in reality come to an end with the
fall of Hua.

The moderates had a firm grip on the political

reigns and the party was consolidated for the first time
since the post-Great Leap Forward period.

134Biograhpical information for Zhao Ziyang in appendix
A.
135I b i d ., 328.
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Chapter IV
Conclusion

This chapter will summarize the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.

It will illustrate the scope of the

thesis by analyzing the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution,
thought.

seen through several elements of Mao Zedong's

It will also appraise the power struggle between

Mao and the moderates led by Liu S h a o q i .

In addition,

it

will evaluate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as a
case study of relying too greatly on a policy that is
idealistic and ignores reality.
Finally,

this thesis will assert that the underlying

basis for the campaign was Mao's desire for revolutionary
immortality.

The thesis will conclude that Mao's obsession

with securing his place in history led him to elliminate any
possible threats to his power,

Analysis

Of

the

Great

at great cost to China.

Proletarian

Cultural

Revolution

From the beginning of Mao's involvement with the Chinese
Communist Party,

he was loyal to the peasantry.

He was

devoted to those who had helped the CCP wrest power from the
KMT.

Mao developed his ideology with the peasants foremost

in his thoughts.

The mass line theory argued that reliance
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upon the people as a whole was the most efficient method to
bring about rapid industrialization.

The continuous

revolution was designed to maintain the enthusiasm sparked by
the struggle for freedom from the previous,

repressive

government and to channel this energy to bring about total
socialism.

Similarly,

the idea of the Reds versus Experts,

struggle between the Maoists and the moderates,

a

was to give

more control of production to the people and less to the
technological elite,

who were Mao's enemies.

This section of the thesis will analyze the importance
of Mao Zedong thought in the implementation of the Great
Cultural Revolution.

The main ideas that Mao wanted to

inculcate in the lives of the people of China were the
continuous revolution,

mass line participation,

upon the official party ideology,

and reliance

coupled with technical

competence to bring about rapid industrialization,
under the slogan red and expert.

summarized

Each of these three

examples of Mao Zedong thought will be explored and appraised
i n div i d u a l l y .
The Continuous Revolution.

Mao's belief that the people were

losing their revolutionary fervor may have been correct, but
the revolution had already been won.

They had committed

themselves to the new government and were making slow
progress in the transition to communism.

Mao wanted to

expedite the reform of China's political system became
traditional Confucianism as well as Western capitalist
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influences still remained after the revolution.

Mao

contended that their presence was hazardous to the system;
that people could become corrupted by them.

Under the slogan

of the continuous revolution, he turned to the young to
revive revolutionary enthusiasm and used the Red Guard to
mobilize and politicize them.

Dependence upon a group of

high school and college students to carry out the campaign
proved to be one of the most catastrophic mistakes of the
Cultural Revolution.

They became intoxicated with power and

employed the movement to sure their selfish ambitions.
Wanton destruction by the Red Guard resulted in two
problems for Mao and his supporters.
purged,

imprisoned,

intellectuals,

First,

the Red Guard

or murdered thousands of cadres and

as well as many others who had nothing to do

with the government.

This indiscriminate persecution created

a void in the bureaucracy and much of government came to a
halt.

Untrained and ineffective replacements were unable to

carry out the duties of the state.

China's economy and

political system could not function and the country collapsed
in c h a o s .
Second,

the intemperance of the Red Guard compelled

Mao

to initiate a tripartite alliance between the new Leftists,
the PLA,

and the rectified cadres to regain order.

This

coalition was evidence that the idea of a continuous
revolution was a failure.
The Mass Line.

Mao's idea in the mass line campaign was to
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involve as many people as possible in the party in order to
lend a great measure of legitimacy to the C C P .

The people

would be more willing to support the system if they were
incorporated into it.
complete failure.

Mao's mass line campaign was a

He failed to realize from the debacle of

the Great Leap Forward that mass participation in a country
as large as China was simply not an efficient method of
industrialization.

Poor planning and leadership resulted in

a great leap backwards instead
industrialization of China.

of a progressive

What Mao should have learned

from the Great Leap Forward is that reliance upon an
idealistic philosophy,
participation,

such as the concept of mass line

cannot serve as a substitute for the use of

trained technocrats.

He believed too strongly that faith in

the peasantry was a suitable replacement for experience and
education; he felt that people could solve any problem,
whether economic,
numbers.

political,

or social, merely by strength in

The Great Leap Forward was a clear example of the

flaws of the mass line theory.
However,

Mao clung tenaciously to the masses by relying

upon them again in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
In this case, he relied upon the Red Guard.

This group of

youths was eager to join in the struggle because as a mass
movement,

it was able to gain a great deal of autonomy.

Over

two million students were involved in the Red Guard, but as
the Great Leap Forward proved,

numbers alone were not enough
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to bring about advances in industrialization or
politicization.

The members of the Red Guard were taken out

of their environment and thrust into a situation that was
destined to bring chaos,

destruction,

tried to purge bureaucrats,

and turmoil as they

intellectuals,

pragmatists,

capitalists and industrial managers.
Once these groups were eliminated,
to run the system,

the Maoists were left

but the peasants and students did not

possess the ability to administor the country effectively.
Most Chinese people were trained for only one task,
farming or working in factories.

such as

They had no management or

technical skills to maintain production and the factories
were unable to function without properly educated
administrators.
The mass line was a failure.
from his previous mistakes.
the industries,

Mao

was unable to learn

Without skilled managers to run

or bureaucrats to carry out policy,

or

intellectuals to criticize the government to point out
weaknesses to be corrected,
Red and E x p e r t .
technocrats,

the system ceased to function.

Mao believed that the intellectuals and

the so called "Experts",

were corrupt and were

plotting to overthrow the system. This conviction compelled
him to replace them with the Reds, the peasants who,
eyes,

were truly dedicated to

system to be preserved,

China.

in Mao's

In order for the

Mao felt that the people should have

a strict devotion to the party and one of the main goals of
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the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,
indoctrinate the people,

therefore,

specifically the young,

was to

to the

practice of Chinese Communism as perceived by its leader.
This infusion of Mao Zedong thought was believed to be a
sufficient substitute for the use of trained technicians in
the bureaucracy and industries.
As the campaign continued,

it became increasingly clear

that Mao had in fact made a serious error with the
implementation of the Red idea.

Chaos,

inefficiency,

and the

near complete collapse of both bureaucratic and industrial
production resulted from the implementation of the concept.
Ordinary workers did not have the proper training to run the
government or the f a c t o r i e s .

Instead of bringing about a

more productive commerce and a more proficient bureaucracy,
the Reds stifled the system,

which regressed due to their

inability to fulfill technical and managerial d u t i e s .

Mao

was simply unwilling to believe that people trained
specifically for the tasks of managing factories and running
the bureaucracy were needed to maintain efficient production.
Workers with very limited technical knowledge were helpless
without the aid of the engineers and bureaucrats.

Mao's

preoccupation with being Red as distinct from Expert
reflected a crucial confrontation between revolutionary
purity and modern technology.

The glorification of Redness

and the undermining of Expertness threatened to eliminate the
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intellectuals as a functioning group.136

This profound

mistake contributed to bringing China's government and
industry to a standstill.

The

Struggle

for

Power

After falling from power,
Great Leap Forward,

due to the failure of the

Mao temporarily retired from politics to

devise a strategy to regain his lost prominence.

The main

objective was to oust the leaders who stood in his way.
accomplish this,

Mao attempted to divide the party into those

who supported him,
other moderates.

To

and those who followed Liu Shaoqi,

and

Mao was able to mobilize enough support to

gain control of the Party Congress by accusing the moderates
of be ing Western capitalists.

He indicted loyal leaders on

such a mass scale that it was impossible to substantiate his
charges.
No one was above suspicion.

Mao contended that the

whole governmental bureaucracy as well as intellectuals had
been corrupted b y Western elements.
accusation was,

in reality,

regain his lost power.

falling victim to his wrath,

53 .

the method by which Mao sought to

His success came at great expense.

Victory was claimed by Mao,

136Lifton,

This wide-scale

and by those who had avoided
in 1969, but the spoils of the
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triumph were hollow.

When the campaign ended, Mao could

claim leadership in name only.

Mao held only de jure

leadership while the moderates possessed de facto control of
the CCP.

Revolutionary

Immortality

Throughout this thesis,

Robert Lifton's term

"revolutionary immortality" has been suggested as one of the
factors which led Mao to such drastic actions.

Lifton argues

that Mao was confronted with his own mortality and
desperately sought measures to insure his place in history.
Lifton furthers asserts that for a man in Mao's position,
his age and special commitments,
of immortality is crucial.

of

the affirmation of a sense

The overwhelming threat is not so

much death itself as the suggestion that his "works" will not
e n d u r e . 137

Mao's ultimate fear,

haunted him,

the image of extinction that

was the death of the revolution.

When he

criticized the Red Guard's inability to fulfill its goals,
his overriding concern was that the revolutionary legacy
would be squandered.

Mao seems to have believed that if the

revolutionary perished,

the revolution would perish as well.

Mao's quest to live forever in the hearts and minds of
his countrymen can serve as an explanation for his apparently

137Ibid,

14.
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irrational decision to launch the the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.

As presented in this thesis,

there is

much evidence that the Cultural Revolution represents the
culmination of a series of conflicts surrounding his
campaigns,

and of Mao's increasing inability to fulfill the

visions or achieve the transformations of the physical and
spiritual environment claimed by the campaigns.138

In fact,

one could view the entire Cultural Revolution as Mao's demand
for renewal of communist life.

In other words,

it was a call

for reassertion of revolutionary immortality.
M a o ’s ultimate purposemay have been to transform China
into communism or an industrial power,

but his more immediate

motives appear to have been much more selfish.

He wanted to

secure his place in history as the greatest leader of China.
He wanted nothing to stand in his way and he eliminated
ruthlessly those he saw as threats to his power.
of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,
back economically,
educationally.

politically,

Ironically,

attaining immortality,

As a result

China was set

industrially and

Mao may have been successful in

but he may be remembered more for his

opportunistic political exploits than for leading China to
communism and modernity.

138Ibid,

21.

Appendix A

Biography
1.

of Maior

Political

Figures

Chen Boda was one of the co-leaders of the Cultural

Group.

It was composed mainly of radical intellectuals and

its purpose,

as a quasi-official agency,

Cultural Revolution.

was to guide the

The Group assumed many of the powers of

the Party Central Committee and Politburo.

Chen was elevated

to one of five members of the p a r t y ’s Standing Committee of
the Politburo as well as being Mao's personal secretary.

His

political demise came when he was directly linked to Lin Biao
in a coup attempt with Lin Biao.

Chen was purged from the

party and labeled as "China's Trotsky."

2.

Chen Xilian was the C ommander of the B ei j i n g military

region.

In autumn 197 8 he was targeted by anti-leftists as

one of the few zealous supporters of Maoist thought.

His

removal marked a further reduction in Hua Guofeng's power.

3.

Chen Yun was ap poi n t e d a member of the S tanding

Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo in 1949.
He was one of China's main economic planners and was
principally responsible for the First Five Year Plan of 195357.

He criticized the Great Leap Forward and was purged form

the party.

After the Maoist era, Chen was reinstated to

advise in the rebuilding of China's economy by Hua Guofeng in
1977.

4.

Deng Xiaoping, a pa rt y activist since the early 1 9 2 0 's,

was the last of the May Fourth generation of Chinese
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Communist leaders.

He made significant contributions to the

revolutionary effort which he earned a prominent place in the
party.
period.

Deng sided with Liu Shaoqi in the post-Great Leap
As a result,

General Secretary.

he was purged while acting as Party

In 1973 he was reinstated to his party

post.

5.

Guan Feng was a mem b e r of the Cultural R evolution Group

and was one of the leading writers and propagandists of the
early stages of the campaign.

He was also a member of the

May 16 Group which was comprised of highly devoted Maoists.
He was eventually identified as an "ultra-left conspirator"
and purged in the late summer of 1969.

6.

Hua Guofeng was ex tr eme ly loyal to Mao and a lifelong

bureaucrat.

He rose through the party ranks to Minister of

Public Security and eventually to Premier of the State
Council.

Relatively unknown in the party mainstream,

seen by Mao as a moderate.

he was

Hua had no true ties to either

the hard-line Maoists or the pragmatists.

Mao hoped that he

would be a stabilizing force in the party,

thus Hua was named

Mao's successor.

Hua's greatest political triumph was

getting rid of the Gang of Four; this action elevated him to
Chairman of the party in autumn of 1976.

He immediately

attempted to institute moderate programs,

re-establish the

educational system and reinstate intellectuals to their
previous positions.
successor,

He began to lose power to his eventual

Deng Xiaoping,

as a result of his failed Ten Year
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Plan.

7.

Jiang Qing, M a o ’s wife and member of the Gang of Four,

assisted Mao with the initiation of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.
Western music,

She led the first assault against

fashion and other cultural influences.

In

197 6 she was tried as a member of the Gang of Four and found
guilty of conspiracy.

8.

Ji Dengkui was the Co mmissar of the B ei jin g region.

Like Chen Xilian, he was removed by anti-leftists in autumn
1978.

9.

Lin Biao replaced Peng Dehuai as Defence Mi ni s t e r in

1959.

This move was Mao's attempt to politicize the PLA and

make it his power base in the Cultural Revolution.

Lin was

Mao's chosen successor until his over ambitious attempt to
assassinate Mao in 1971 was discovered.

His demise came

about as a result of a plane crash while trying to flee the
country for refuge in the Soviet Union.

10.

Liu Shaoqi was one of five members of the Standing

Committee of the CCP Politburo in 1949.

Ten years later,

took the position of Chairman of the People's Republic,
was a governmental post.
Revolution,

Liu

which

In the Great Proletarian Cultural

he was Mao's main political rival because he

supported a more pragmatic approach to Chinese politics.
was purged by Mao at the end of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution in 1969.

After his death Liu was

readmitted to the Communist Party and his purge was

He
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denounced.

11.

Lu Dingyi was a top party official and was most famous

for his speeches which inspired the Hundred Flower's
Campaign.

He supported and encouraged intellectuals to

express themselves freely in the campaign.

12.

Mao Zedong was China's most notable po li tical figure.

He was one of the founding members of the Chinese Communist
Party and was party Chairman from the revolution in 1948 to
his death in 1976.

Mao was the one of the most noted leaders

during the Revolution.

He ascended to top the party position

after the revolution because of his strong leadership.

Mao

was committed to orchestrating China on a path to his version
of communism.

He was a ruthless leader who purged anyone who

oppossed his ideology,

especially during the Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The Red Gurard,

groups

sanctioned by Mao, were responsible for purging the majority
of those who were accussed of having Wester-bourgeois ideals.
Among his other political campaigns were the Great Leap
Forward,

which was an attempt to industrialize China and be

competitive in the world economy; the Hundred Flowers
Campaign,

which was an attempt to incorporate intellectuals

into the communist system.
political vehicle,

Using the campaigns as a

Mao attempted to implement his ideology in

the CCP and the government which permeated Chinese society.
His political philosophy was published in small red covered
books.

These books were carried by millions of Chinese
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supposedly to give them guidance from their Chairman.

Near

the end of his life Mao was concerned that his vision of
revolution would not be carried out to its end; he became
increasingly concerned that his legacy would perish when he
died.

In part,

his suspicions were true because soon after

his death a power struggle ensued and the moderates
eventually assumed control of the party.

13.

Peng Dehuai was a ve te ran r evolutionary who h a d p la y e d

a major role in the formation of the Red Army.

He rose

through the military to attain the position of Minister of
Defense.

He lead an attack on the policies of the Great Leap

Forward.

Peng condemned communization,

national planning,

the collapse of

the alienation of the party from the

masses A nd the oppressive economic conditions and political
practices,

all of which he attributed to the "petty bourgeois

fanaticism" of Maoists.

For his outspokenness,

Peng was

subsequently purged at the outset of the Cultural Revolution.

14.

Peng Zhen was an anti-Maoist and leader of the Beiji ng

Communist Party.

He criticized Mao for the Great Leap

Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

Mao purged him for

obstructing the campaign and he is most famous for being the
first political victim of the Cultural Revolution.

15.

Qi Benyu, similar to Guan Feng, was a mem b e r of the

Cultural Revolution Group and the May 16 Group,

met

the same

political fate by being purged in the late autumn of 1969.

16.

Wang Dongxing c o n t r o l l e d the secret p ol ice in
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Shanghai.

He is most famous for arresting the Gang of Four

in 197 6 after Mao's death.
security establishment,

Also, he ws the gead of the

and led the so-called "whatever

faction" after Mao's death.

He was subsequently purged by

Deng Xiaoping for having remote ties to the Maoists.

17.

Wang Hongwen was the leader of the R e v o l u tio na ry

Revolt of Shanghai Workers.

This group was created by

Shanghai workers and had no affiliations with the party or
the g o v e r n m e n t .

They proclaimed loyalty to Mao and the

movement but interpreted Maoist principles to suit their own
needs.

Wang formed an alliance with Zhang Chunqiao to

incorporate the workers into the Cultural Revolution.

He

eventually became a member of the party's ruling Standing
Committee of the Politburo with Zhang.

His most famous role

in the Cultural Revolution was as a member of the Gang of
Four.

18.

Wang Li, ultra-leftist, m ember of the Cultural

Revolution Group and radical intellectual reached his
political peak in 1967 when the ultra-leftists appeared to be
gaining political ground.

This was short lived,

however,

because he was accused of being a counter-revolutionary and
was purged from the movement.

19.

Wu Han, part y official and historian, was the author of

the play "Hai Jui Dismissed From Office."

This criticized

Mao's removal of Peng Dehuai after he opposed The Great Leap
Forward.

The play woul d become the impetus for Mao to

91
challenge the loyalty of party m e m b e r s .

20.

Zhang Chunqiao was the secretary of the

Shanghai

Party Committee until he replaced Chen Boda as the leader of
the Cultural Revolution Group.

He was responsible for

incorporating the workers of Shanghai into the Cultural
Revolution.

He believed that the workers could replace the

corrupt managers and run the factories using Maoist thought
as a guideline.

Zhang developed the Shanghai commune to

follow M a o ’s model for communist society.

The commune failed

and Zhang was forced to explain this to the people of
Shanghai.

He was promoted to the p a r t y ’s Standing Committee

of the Politburo after the fall of Lin Biao.

He finally

became Second Vice Premier of the party to Deng Xiaoping but
was never appointed to the Premiership.

21.

Zhao Ziyang, chosen by Deng Xiaop ing to be Premier of

the State Council in September of 1980, marking the beginning
of a new generation of leaders for the Chinese Communist
Party.

Zhao was one of the first non-Long March era members

to attain such a lofty party position.

22.

Zhou Enlai was a p po in ted P rem ie r of the State Council

by Mao in 1949.

He provided much of the continuity and

stability to the civilian state structure.
M a o ’s oldest and most trusted comrades.

Zhou was one of

Politically,

he was

a moderate who tried to hold the government together and had
no further party ambitions.

Appendix B

The

Chinese

Communist

Party

and

Government.

Although the party and government have similar
structures,

this appendix will illustrate the

differences between

the two.

Often individuals will

serve in government

and party posts simultaneously. The

outline of the party and government will be presented to
depict the individual systems and their differences.

The

Chinese

Communist.

Party

The party is divided into three basic levels,
center, province and city.

the

Although each of the three

has similar hierarchical structures,
for its individual jurisdiction.

each is responsible

The central party is

the ideological focus of the party formulating the
official party line

for all of the levels to follow.

The lower echelons

of the party hierarchy report to

the upper levels and receive their directives from the
higher tiers.

This pattern is repeated throughout the

three ranks; the central directs the province and the
province guides the city.

For example,

higher party

committees have the power to review officials elected by
lower congresses and can assign leadership to lower
levels without their approval.

It should be noted that

some city party organizations such as Beijing and
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Shanghai have more influence than other provincial
structures namely Tibet Ixizangi and Heilongijiang
because of their geographical locations and
demographics.
The most important party body is the representative
congress.

All the leading members who form the

committees that carry out the actual functions of the
party belong to this assembly.

The members are sent by

their regions to attend the National Party Congress
which convenes every five years.
constitution,

(Pursuant to the party

the congress may convene earlier or later

than the designated five years if required.)
The Central Committee acts for the Congress and is
its most important representative body.

The Central

Committee is identified by the number of the congress
that elected it, with its full meeting known as plenums
which are held on an annual basis.
While the Congress is not in session,

the daily

functions are carried out by its Standing Committee,
Politburo and the Secretaries.

In reality,

the

it is the

committees that run the party; the committee members
have little control over the proceedings and simply
ratify the committees'
decisions.

directives,

lending legitimacy to

The agenda and nominations for offices are

controlled by the Standing Committee of the Congress
Presidium which is elected by the congressional
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delegates on the day before the congress c o n v e n e s .
During the session,

delegates devote most of their time

to small groups discussing leadership reports and
candidate lists for the Central Committee,
Commission for Discipline Inspection,

the

the Advisory

Committee and other smaller C o m m i t t e e s .
The Central Committee acts for the Congress and is
its most important representative body.

The Central

Committee is identified by the number of the congress
that elected it, with its full meeting known as plenums
which are held on an annual basis.
The party leadership is provided by the
Secretariat,

the Politburo,

the General Secretary.
Central Committee;

1981,

These posts are elected by the

the General Secretary presides over

the Central Committee,
Committee.

its Standing Committee and

the Politburo and its Standing

Until Hu Yaobang succeeded Hua Guofeng in

the General Secretary was known as the Party

Chairman.
The Standing Committee is comprised of members who
chair various Commissions such as the Military
Commission.

The Politburo and its Standing Committee

are the highest decision makers.
The Secretariat is responsible for administering
detailed work of the party which would be impossible for
the Congress as a whole to undertake.

Nine members
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constitute the Secretariat,
party departments.

they delegate tasks to lower

Through this bureaucracy,

the

Politburo controls the execution of daily assignments
from

the central level down to the basic party groups

established in every unit of Chinese society.
The party has. a similar structure throughout its
levels.

The majority of public policy was formulated in

the Central Committee of the Party Congress.
Cultural Revolution,

During the

Mao unrivaled leader of the party

and the sole dictator of China.

The

state Structure
The party is mirrored by its counterpart the State.

The major function of the government is to lend
legitimacy to the party directives,

and to administer

party policy through the bureaucracy.

This section of

the appendix will illustrate the governmental system
focusing on the National People's Congress and its
divisions as outlined in the State Constitution of 1982.
China has a unified state organization that
includes four major hierarchies: the people's congress
system,

the government,

procuratorate.

the courts and the

The people's congresses are

representative assemblies meeting once a year.
government,

from the state council to local

The
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administrators,

is the executive and administrative

bureaucracy of the state.

Typically,

its highest

officials are elected by the people's congress at each
level.

Officials of the two legal hierarchies,

judiciary and the procuracy,

the

are also elected by the

people's congress.
Similar to the party structure,

the State has its

own National People's Congress which meets to discuss
and approve work reports,
drafts and,

the state plan,

legislative

during the first session of its term,

the major officials of government.

elect

It is comprised of

approximately 3,000 delegates who meet once a year for a
five-year term.

Delegates are elected by provincial-

level people's congresses,
Congress.

There are six permanent committees:

minorities,
Chinese,

the same as in the Party

law finance,

foreign affairs,

overseas

and one responsible for education,

culture and health.

science,

A presidium with a standing

committee presides over the sessions and controls the
agenda,
offices.
base,

the routing of legislation,and nominations for
The congress gives legitimacy and a popular

rather than to chart the political course of the

country which is the party's responsibility.
The majority of the government's power resides with
the standing committee of the National People's Congress
with fewer than 200 members,

meeting every two months.

The group that heads this council and controls the
government's agenda is the chair committee,
incorporating the chairman of the standing committee,
the vice-chairman,
two members.

the secretary and a total

of twenty-

The standing committee delegates issues to

subcommittees that are active in coordinating
legislation between different governmental organs and in
communicating with provincial governments and standing
committees.

Interlevel contact is encouraged by

allowing the leadership of provincial standing
committees to attend meetings of the National People's
Congress standing committee.139

139The information for the structure of the party
and government was obtained from Townsend and Womack, 82151.
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